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No. 3, May-Jun 1983

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES IN JOURNAL 'NARODY AZII I AFRIKI'

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 83 pp 220-222

[Text] Colonies and Dependent Countries: Problems of Historical Development

G.K. Shirokov

The article demonstrates four principal differences in the historical development of former colonies and semi-colonies. In the first place, the social structures of colonies were disrupted to a far greater extent than those in depended countries. Secondly, the dissemination of the bourgeois law, ideology, etc. in the context of belonging to the "colonial power-colony" system opened up here wider vista for capitalist development. Thirdly, there was a substantial difference in the role of the state: whereas in colonies the state subordinated the development process to the interest of the colonial power, in dependent countries the activity of the state was directed rather at consolidating national sovereignty. Fourthly, colonies and dependent countries were characterised by different combinations of social and national goals of their national liberation movements. Today, these differences continue to exert their influence upon the processes of socio-economic development of the both groups of countries.

Socialist International and the Middle East Conflict

V.Ya. Shveytser

The article analyzes the policy of the Socialist International, an international body dominated by West European social democratic leaders, toward the Arab-Israelian conflict from 1973 to 1982.

After the October War of 1973, which marked a watershed in the policy of the Socialist International, it abandoned an openly pro-Israelian stand and turned to diplomatic rope-walking. The article notes that during the talks held between Egypt and Israel, which resulted in the Camp David agreement, the leaders of the Socialist International by and large had supported the efforts of Sadat and Begin. Following the signing of this agreement and taking into account the negative response in the Arab world, they took a more critical view of the separate solution to the Middle East conflict.

Following the early 1980's many leaders of the Socialist International acknowledged that finding solution to the Palestinian problem and participation

in the negotiations of the Palestine Liberation Organization was of paramount importance. The attitude toward Israel became more critical after the Israeli armed forces attacked the Palestinians in Lebanon in the summer of 1982. The Socialist International, however, has not worked out a common stand (so far as the social democracy is concerned) toward the Middle East conflict. This is accounted for by a controversial position of the West European social democracy which is constantly maneuvering between the interests of the West European monopolies and the demands of the progressive sections of Europe. Another hitch in adopting a balanced approach is the fact that the Socialist International was joined by some political parties of the developing world which do not share the views of their European partners on this issue.

"Islamic Revivalism"

M.T. Stepanyants

Recently the role of revivalist ideas in Islam has been significantly increased. Religious ideologists, no matter which trend of thought they adhere to, are inclined to claim that their goal is the revival of Islam. The wide scope of the term "revivalism" and its great attraction for the masses desiring complete independence and genuine national revival make it possible for the ideologists of different classes to use a revivalist cover for their political platforms.

However it seems more proper to call "revivalist" those conceptions which speak not of an abstract revival of the spirit of Islam, but suggest the introduction and the realization in the modern society of certain concrete principles and institutions of early Islam. In this article revivalism is mainly regarded as a type of religious consciousness of peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. These are social groups which hate the feudal means of exploitation, but suffers from the burdens of the capitalist system. Opposing both the feudal past and the bourgeois present, they try to find justification and support for their strivings and desires in the early period of Islam. Consequently, the idea of national revival through the purification of early belief has arisen.

Due to its contradictory attitude to socio-economic changes (their desire for and at the same time dissatisfaction with changes that take usual forms of the capitalist social order) it becomes typical for the petty bourgeoisie to hesitate in their choice. Sometimes they join the counter-reformers, the opponents of the bourgeois reforms (one may call them "regressivist revivalist"), sometimes they side with the supporters of the radical reforms ("progressivist revivalist").

The enhancing role of the revivalist tendencies which can be observed today in the Moslem world does not mean the end of process of reformation in Islam. Such a pessimistic estimation of the prospects for Islamic reformation is a result of the erroneous reduction of revivalism to its counter-reformation regressive type. It is the logical consequence of ignoring the rise of the "progressive" conceptions of revivalism which signify the expansion and the extension of the reformatory process in Islam. The latter means gradually involving in the movement rather wide sections of the population. This leads to the democratization and radicalization of the Islamic reformation.

Provincial Administration and State Feudalism in Burma

A.S. Agadzhanian

The role played by the state in the social structure of the societies of South and South-East Asia in the Middle Ages and the New Time was a decisive and a comprehensive one. As a matter of fact, the ruling class realized itself by and large as a state apparatus. Hence, it is of interest to examine the mechanism of the socio-political integration of the centralized feudal and bureaucratic monarchies. This mechanism is manifested particularly at the provincial, or the grass-root level where the state apparatus comes into direct contact with the basic social structure. This accounts for our interest in the Burmese local administration of the 18th and the 19th century. To investigate into this stratum the author used such an informative and reliable source as *sit-tans*, or the reports of local hereditary officials submitted to the central government. It is suggested that the discussed stratum was a key-element of the social structure, as a whole. Apart from belonging to the Centre, the centralized state apparatus and through latter to the imperial unity, the local official was a part of the local society, as a discrete and self-sufficient entity. This duality was rooted in the fact that the power of the local official was a part of the local society, as a discrete and self-sufficient entity. This duality was rooted in the fact that the power of the local official within his jurisdiction was based not only on his being a part of the state apparatus, but on the established tradition of discretionary local power, which was ensured by the hereditary nature of the local post. It is the acknowledgement of this duality that allows to account for the fact that the official's power and income are divided, according to the analysis of *sit-tans*, into two parts, an official and non-official one. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of a detailed analysis of the official's functions, his incomes and the methods of local exploitation. The essence of this duality lies in the following fact. On the one hand, as a member of state apparatus, the local official was a bureaucrat, on the other hand, as a member of local exploitation. The essence of this duality lies in the following fact. On the one hand, as a member of state clan he was an aristocrat. It is hard to draw a line between the "bureaucratic" and "aristocratic" characteristics of this social type, for they form one single whole. This entity, or, to be more accurate, a compromise of the central and local structures, of bureaucracy and aristocracy, is a crucial factor of the traditional oriental society.

On Traditional Arts in Tropical Africa

An.A. Gromyko

The article examines the arts of sculpture and masks of the people of Tropical Africa. It conceptualizes the history of the traditional African arts on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology and elicits its specific features. The article suggests some patterns of development which largely determined the origin of arts in Tropical Africa.

The article emphasizes that today the wooden sculpture and masks of Tropical Africa are characterized by specific styles which are formed by individual ethnic groups. At the same time, this sculpture and masks have their own African nature which allows to distinguish them from similar oeuvres of other peoples. The article criticizes the term "primitive arts" which is widespread in the West European and American studies of the traditional African arts. It considers this term to be incorrect, for it does not, *inter alia*, reveal the subject-matter, let alone the message of the African arts.

The article concludes that notwithstanding the headway made in the study of the African arts, there is a great deal of unresolved complex and topical problems, including that of providing a systematic classification of the traditional art of sculpture and masks and the analysis of its impact upon the African arts.

Attitude of Adult Japanese to Their Old Age Parents

I.A. Latyshev

The article deals with the changes which the relationship of adult Japanese and their old age parents underwent in the post-war period. It notes, inter alia, the dying out of the parents' cult and the tendency on the part of children to shirk their filial duties.

The article goes into economic, social and demographic reasons of this phenomenon and states disintegration of the clan family as one of them. Both old age parents and their grown up children are taking more and more to living apart. Using opinion polls and official statistics, the article examines the position of parents which live together with their children and those which live apart. It also tackles the distribution of family chores and family budget between parents and children and examines the relations between the female in-laws.

The article suggests that today the role of the old folk in the family is gradually diminishing. The adult children and, in particular, daughters-in-law are the one who play the first fiddle. These changes in the family position of the old folk are far from conforming to their vital interests and aspirations in many regards. It is the author's contention that the gradual deterioration of the old folks' position is accounted for by the crisis phenomena in the life of the present-day Japanese society.

Towards the Problem of Categories of Traditional Chinese Culture

The recent years were marked by a growing interest of Soviet Chinese scholars to the analysis of the traditional Chinese culture in terms of its own notions and terminology. A series of special sessions held in the Department of China of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Science in 1980 and reports made at the annual conference "State and Society in China" in 1980 to 1982 were devoted to this problem. It was in this regard that "The Peoples of Asia and Africa" invited a group of Soviet sinologists to take part in the debate on this issue.

The presentation of A.I. Kobzev and his list of 100 units of basic notions and categories of the traditional Chinese philosophy and culture were taken as a basis for the discussion. A.I. Kobzev holds the view that the main problems bearing relationship to this field are following: elucidation of a clear-cut and full meaning of basic categories of the Chinese philosophy, of the nature of their interaction, their semantic transformation in the process of historical development, of their relations to other basic categories of other forms of social consciousness, i.e. finding out whether the basic categories of the Chinese philosophy constitute basic categories of the Chinese culture.

It is A.I. Kobzev's contention that the categories of the Chinese philosophy are also the categories of the Chinese culture and are to be taken symbolically as such. These symbols presume different plans of interpretation, including metaphoric, scientific and philosophical ones. As a result of a long-running and uninterrupted historical development on the basis of a uniform linguistic substratum and within the framework of a uniform cultural tradition, these symbols formed into a system. A.I. Kobzev suggested a definition of the category of the traditional Chinese culture. This is an abstract notion, which has a unique and quite definite hieroglyphic equivalent, and in terms of classification is related to the notions traditionally considered to be the basic ones in the Chinese philosophy. These notions have correlatives on all the levels of social consciousness and cultural activity, i.e. in science, arts, everyday consciousness, traditional ways of life, etc.

On the strength of the abovementioned suggestion A.I. Kobzev believes that the analysis and translation in toto in fundamental Chinese texts should be preceded by the study of the system of categories which underlie them. This standpoint runs counter to the one established in the Soviet sinology. The discussion initiated by "The Peoples of Asia and Africa" reveals a whole spectrum of opinions, both converging with the suggestions of A.I. Kobzev and those which are in stark disagreement with them.

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FORMER COLONIES, OTHER ASIAN STATES CONTRASTED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 83 pp 3-9

[Article by G.K. Shirokov: "Colonies and Dependent Countries: Problems of Historical Distinction"]

[Text] Soviet literature does not always make a sufficiently precise distinction between colonies and dependent countries when studying the national liberation movement and economic history of oriental countries. Such an approach might be justified if such aspects of the subject as the relations of the colonially dependent periphery with imperialism, its position on the world market and in the world capitalist economy and so forth are studied; in this case distinctions between the two types of countries dependent on imperialism are really minimal or are absent altogether. Upon a study of internal processes--economic, social and, frequently, political also--on the other hand, quite appreciable differences between the said categories of countries may be ascertained. Of course, it is a question merely of the most general differences since serious differences between the said categories of countries may be ascertained. Of course, it is a question merely of the most general differences since serious differences are observed within each group of countries also: in the level of socioeconomic development on the eve of the loss or limitation of sovereignty, degree of involvement in the international division of labor and so forth. The study of these differences is of more than just historical interest: they continue to have a pronounced impact on all social processes in present-day developing countries.

Upon a comparison of colonies and dependent countries attention is attracted primarily by the fact that in the first case there has been a considerably greater breakup of the social structures than in the second. In fact, with the acquisition of the first colonies in the East the metropolises or their monopoly trading companies did away with the upper stratum of the local ruling class or deprived it of real power and arrogated to themselves the right of supreme ownership of natural resources, particularly land, and the collection of taxes. The collection of a raised land tax,¹ the organization of fiscal monopolies (salt, opium, tobacco and others) and the imposition of forced labor with respect to the collection or production of products for export together with direct plunder of the treasures which had been accumulated by the local elite and religious institutions secured huge revenues for the metropolis or monopoly trading company.

The establishment of colonial domination entailed a change in the essence of many social structures. First, inasmuch as the power of the upper stratum of the local ruling class had been transferred to the colonial machinery the numerous servants, the army and, partially, the local religious institutions also forfeited their social functions and revenues. The redistribution of revenue to the benefit of the colonial machinery led to the ruin of the group of top urban trades which had produced various items of luxury and worship, weapons and such for the upper strata of the local society.² In the new situation a considerable proportion of the "superfluous" population was forced to merge into agriculture. The result was an absolute reduction in the number of urban inhabitants, of the big cities particularly, and a decline in the proportion of industrial types of labor compared with nonindustrial types. The policy of the colonial authorities also contributed to the "agrarianization" of the economy. With the exception of perhaps India, which was supplying the metropolis with finished products even prior to the completion of the industrial revolution in England, raw material, chiefly agricultural, was exported from the remaining colonies. Inasmuch as agriculture in the oriental countries was distinguished by greater productivity than industry³ the "agrarianization" of the economy enabled the metropolis to increase the degree of exploitation of the colony. At the same time, however, the conversion of agriculture into the main target of exploitation brought about the mothballing of production relations and, frequently, the regression even of the production forces in this sector.

Second, supreme ownership of natural resources enabled the colonial machinery to create huge amounts of available land intended for the organization of plantation production or the resettlement of colonialists from the metropolis.⁴ In turn, this afforded opportunities for the introduction of entirely new crops and changes in the specialization of the economy. At the same time limitation of the local peasantry's access to the land led to a narrowing of opportunities for reproduction of the peasant economy in traditional forms and on the traditional scale.

The introduction of the right of private ownership of the land, the breakup of the community, the forced commercialization of agriculture and the involvement of the colonies in the international division of labor gradually brought about the appearance of new and the transformation, albeit partial, of the traditional strata and classes and thereby a further change in the society's social structure. It was for this reason that the traditional socioeconomic structures have not been preserved in practice in pure form in the former colonies.

As far as dependent countries are concerned, the processes of the breakup of the traditional structures could not have been of such a transient and extensive nature. This was explained primarily by the fact that, despite the limitation of sovereignty ensuing from unequal treaties, capitulation conditions and such, power remained in the hands of the upper stratum of the traditional ruling class. For the latter the preservation of the traditional structures was the basis of its existence and power. For this reason the structures of the economy and society changed here mainly under the impact of external influences. These influences may conditionally be characterized as: a) the involvement of sectors of local production in world trade; b) the investment of foreign capital; and c) the competition of foreign commodities.

It is perfectly natural that not all sectors of the economy of the dependent countries were pulled into world trade but merely those which for this reason or the other had a certain competitiveness on the world market. And, furthermore, as distinct from the colonies, these were not only agricultural sectors producing this raw material or the other in particular demand but also sectors of local prefactory industry: China, for example, supplied the world market with tea and silk, Turkey with carpets, Iran with carpets and dressed leather and so forth. It was these sectors which primarily were subject to the "civilizing" influence of foreign trade. As far as the other sectors of the economy operating on the domestic market were concerned, they experienced merely the indirect, intermediate impact of the world market, and the changes in them were comparatively slower.

Several circumstances had an impact on the scale, sphere of application and nature of the activity of foreign capital in the dependent oriental countries. The weakness of the production infrastructure and the incomplete nature of the process of the development of a single national market curbed the investment of foreign capital in sectors of material production serving the domestic market. For this reason the bulk of foreign investments in the dependent countries was concentrated in the sphere of export trade and finances, the industrial sectors for processing raw material for export and also in transport and communications. Further, in the dependent countries the degree of risk (on account of the measures of the local authorities and popular movements, the competition of other foreign powers and so forth) for foreign investments was immeasurably higher than in the colonies. Consequently, the investments made by foreign capital (per local inhabitant) were lower here than in the colonies.⁵ The said risk brought about the predominantly concession form of foreign enterprise in the dependent countries for, enjoying the rights of extraterritoriality within the limits of the concession, the foreign entrepreneur acquired great freedom of activity here. At the same time, however, the concession system created the basis for enclave development, and in a number of instances directly held back the development of the production forces in the dependent country inasmuch as foreigners frequently sought concessions not in order to build some facility or the other or organize this form of production of the other but to prevent the admittance of competitors from other imperialist countries to a given sector of the economy or region.⁶

Foreign commodity imports were also distinguished by great specificity. As is known, for a long time import tariffs in the colonies simply did not exist; when they were imposed, the competitiveness of local production was artificially lowered by way of the establishment of compensatory excise dues. Although the acts of capitulation signed by the dependent countries usually prohibited the raising of customs tariffs, they were constantly in existence, nonetheless, which was automatically reflected in the competitiveness of the products imported from the developed capitalist countries. An appreciable influence on imports was also exerted by the backwardness of the dependent countries' tax system--the preservation of carriage dues, municipal charges and so forth.⁷ As a result the competition of factory goods of the West with the products of local industry in the dependent, but not colonized countries was evidently somewhat weaker than in the colonies.

The structure of prefactory production also changed differently in the countries which had maintained a formal independence. Preservation of the upper stratum of the ruling class contributed to the survival here of urban trades producing luxury items; European competition ruined mainly the representatives of the lowest forms of handicrafts production producing goods in everyday demand.⁸ As a result there was a deterioration in the conditions of reproduction of local handicrafts production. Yet as a consequence of the nature of the sectorial structure and particular features of reproduction the lowest forms of industry of the dependent countries were even less adapted to development into factory industry than in the colonies.

Thus as a result of their involvement in the international division of labor an increase in the heterogeneousness of the economic and social structures and the preservation of traditional structures unaffected or only slightly affected by outside influences and the appearance of new structures were observed in the dependent countries. The preservation of power in the hands of the upper stratum of the local ruling class imparted a traditional outer covering to these new structures to a far greater extent than was observed in the colonies.

Another difference between the colonies and dependent countries consisted of the different opportunities and capacities for the absorption of elements of the collapse of the traditional structures, that is, the conditions for the establishment of a new production mode were different. In the colonies (this applies to a lesser extent to the Spanish and Portuguese colonies) from the very outset the legal basis of their exploitation had been bourgeois law. In addition, as the purveyor of bourgeois ideology, the colonial machinery wittingly or unwittingly implanted bourgeois relationships in the colonies. This was manifested particularly graphically in the introduction of private ownership of land, stimulation of the development of commodity-money relations, the introduction of bourgeois commercial law and so forth. Under the conditions of the spread of bourgeois ideology and bourgeois law even traditionalism frequently acquired a capitalist appearance. Thus debt slavery and payment in work acquired the form of wage labor, and usurious interest and feudal rent the form of dividends.⁹ All this undoubtedly contributed to the transformation of elements of the collapse of the traditional structures into comparatively modern structures, particularly in the urban economy.

In the dependent countries, on the other hand, development for a relatively prolonged period occurred on the basis of the domination of the traditional standards of ideology and law. In many cases--Ch'ing China, Turkey, Iran and Thailand--supreme ownership of the land remained in the hands of the state. Although a considerable proportion of this land had already been seized by various categories of proprietors, the absence of a legal basis and the efforts made by the state to return part of the land held back the process of capitalist evolution. The fact that business was traditionally regarded as not very respectable and was frequently also held back by various bureaucratic restrictions was also of significance in a number of dependent countries. In some cases the merchant or businessman were not guaranteed protection of their property or of their life even. This, evidently, was a most important reason for the weak entrepreneurial activity of representatives of the local population in Turkey, Thailand and Iran and the broad scale of the operations of the bourgeoisie of different nationality. Finally, the

development of capitalist relations in the dependent countries was held back by the absence of modern commercial law and the concept of limited ownership, the absence of mining law provisions, the lack of sanctions for breach of contract and so forth. Although the imperialist powers endeavored to revise archaic legislation in the dependent countries, this revision took a very long time or was not always successful.¹⁰

As a result local capitalist enterprise was formed extremely slowly. In the dependent countries it was characterized by incompleteness and the existence of many transitional features. Here, as already mentioned, capitalist enterprise itself often acquired a traditional outer covering.¹¹

The third distinction between the colonies and dependent countries consisted of the role of the state in the economic and social spheres. The colonial administrative machinery was a ramification and part of the state of the metropolis and was wholly responsible to it for ensuring "normal" conditions of the colony's exploitation. It performed quite extensive economic and social functions not characteristic in that period of the bourgeois state in Europe or North America. The colonial machinery had to encourage and sometimes undertake the development of the infrastructure and also the production forces which facilitated the exploitation of the colony or altered the specialization of its economy in accordance with the requirements of the world market. At the same time it was obliged to put a stop to the forms of activity of the local bourgeoisie or companies of other imperialist states which might have constituted competition for the metropolis or weakened its influence in the colony.¹² Great attention was paid to regulating the training and use of local personnel: in the majority of the colonies local personnel was not admitted to certain sectors of management and the economy, while in the others it occupies, as a rule, merely secondary positions. In other words, endowed with broader economic and social functions, the colonial machinery was used for the maximum subordination of the colony to the interests of the metropolis. In accelerating the development of new production forces and new classes the activity of the colonial authorities exacerbated the contradictions between these new classes and the metropolis.

In the dependent countries the situation was far more complex and contradictory. On the one hand the capitulation conditions imposed on the group of states in question, as also traditions and the conservatism of the local ruling class, had a negative impact on economic development. On the other, the concern to preserve national sovereignty and its own economic and social positions forced the upper stratum of the ruling class to implement certain measures. Trained personnel was urgently needed to run the state, particularly the army, navy, military enterprises and finances. The regular dispatch of people to Europe for training began back in the final quarter of the 19th century; foreign advisers also were enlisted on a comparatively broad scale.

In a precapitalist environment and given acute foreign competition, only the state could undertake the construction of major facilities both of infrastructural and production purpose. Whence the appearance of the state sector, which played an important part in the development of modern industry in the dependent countries.¹³ A particular feature of this state enterprise

should be mentioned. Objectively it contributed to the development of capitalist relations and the accelerated formation of a national bourgeoisie and proletariat. At the same time, guided by traditional ideas of the role of the state in the East, the upper stratum of the ruling class subjectively did not want this. It believed that major facilities both in the sphere of the infrastructure and in material production should belong to the state.¹⁴ As a result it was precisely in the dependent countries that there first emerged such a phenomenon as etatism, which in this form or the other became so widespread in the overwhelming majority of developing countries after their achievement of political independence.

Under the conditions of dependence and the constant pressure of imperialism the inception of state enterprise proved highly contradictory. While contributing at a certain stage to the development of the production forces and the formation of new strata of bourgeois society, it at the same time consolidated the position of the traditional ruling upper stratum. There was a sharp exacerbation of the struggle within the ruling class itself between its conservative part connected with the traditional production forces and the radical part which had grown up on the basis of the development of the new production forces and new methods of management. The development of capitalism was held back after the initial impulses had expired.

Pronounced differences between the colonies and dependent countries can be traced, finally, with respect to the type of social evolution also. In the colonies, where, as already mentioned, the traditional structures and the relations connected with them had been undermined, there were certain opportunities for the growth of transitional structures into capitalist structures. The main obstacle on this path was foreign domination, which was accompanied by the exorbitant confiscation of the net product of the colonial society and the devastating competition of import products. It was precisely foreign domination which gave rise to the national liberation movement. Its goal was the achievement of national sovereignty, social tasks receding to a secondary position; some liberation movements did not advance slogans of a social nature at all.

A different system of priorities took shape in the dependent countries. The preservation of national sovereignty, albeit abridged by unequal treaties, created certain opportunities for development. But this development could not take place as long as a conservative traditional ruling elite was in power. Although the new classes and strata of bourgeois society were very weak here, the existence in the ruling class of a European-educated stratum occupying influential positions, which understood the need for the rapid surmounting of backwardness for the purpose of preserving national sovereignty, markedly increased the potential of the forces which advocated a change in traditional relations. It was this stratum of the ruling class which was the leader of the bourgeois revolutions (the Young Turks, the Shanghai and others) which rolled over the majority of dependent countries.¹⁵

Usually the bourgeois revolutions in the dependent countries are defined in literature as upper-crust revolutions. Considering the nature of the leadership and the composition of the driving forces, it could not have been

otherwise in that period. Nonetheless, the limitation (Iran, Thailand) or liquidation (Turkey, China) of the power of the traditional ruling upper stratum afforded certain scope for the development of capitalism. At the same time, however, the expansion of the new regime's social base and the more consistent defense of the interests of the ruling class exacerbated relations with imperialism and contributed to an intensification of the struggle for the abrogation of unequal treaties. Soviet Russia's renunciation of unequal treaties and for a number of countries--particularly Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan--direct support for the anti-imperialist struggle on its part were conducive to their victory.

In the period which has elapsed since World War II the main legal and political differences between former colonies and dependent countries have been effaced: they all now constitute the group of developing countries. Nonetheless, the historical past still leaves a marked imprint on their socioeconomic development.

In the former colonies the national bourgeoisie (independently or in a bloc with other exploiter classes or strata) came to power on the crest of the wave of the national liberation movement. The possession of state power, the demolition back in the colonial period even of a number of important traditional structures and the extensive spread of bourgeois law and ideology are enabling the national bourgeoisie by way of partial reforms to gradually remove the vestiges of precapitalist relations. Although the contradictions of bourgeois society are moving to the forefront to an ever greater extent in this group of countries, the socioeconomic positions of the modern capitalist sector and the strata of the population connected therewith remain limited, which localizes and curbs the social thrust and is now permitting capitalism to develop predominantly by the evolutionary path.

The upper-crust nature of the bourgeois revolutions in the former dependent countries caused the preservation of the great heterogeneousness of their economic and social structures. Power has been concentrated in the hands of the bourgeoisifying (but not yet bourgeoisified) stratum of the traditional exploiter classes, whose potentialities have been insufficient for removing precapitalist and transitional relations. As a result, as capitalism develops in these countries, two groups of interconnected contradictions are becoming aggravated: between the capitalist and precapitalist forms of the economy; and between labor and capital in a capitalist production structure. All this is contributing to the growth of social and political tension. In some countries these contradictions are being resolved on the paths of new revolutions of the most diverse type. In others the social and political tension is forcing the ruling class to resort periodically to the imposition of dictatorship, which solves the urgent contradictions by forcible methods in the interests of the modernizing strata of the ruling class.

FOOTNOTES

1. "In societies enslaved by colonial aggressors... the intensified effect of the taxation-obligation system... led to the direct destruction of the production forces in the peasant economy" (V. Danilov, L. Danilova, V. Rastyannikov, "Main Stages of the Development of the Peasant Economy" in "Agrarian Structures of Oriental Countries: Genesis, Evolution, Social Transformations," Moscow, 1977, p 21).
2. See A.P. Kolontayev, "The Lowest Forms of Production in the Countries of South and Southeast Asia," Moscow, 1975, p 208.
3. K. Marx wrote: "Given a primitive, precapitalist mode of production, farming is more productive than industry since nature here participates in man's work as machine and organism, whereas in industry the forces of nature are still almost entirely replaced by human power (as, for example, in handicrafts industry and so forth)" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol 26, pt II, p 115).
4. Thus in Ceylon 65 percent of the cultivated land was seized for plantations (Yu.N. Maslov, "Ceylon's Plantation Economy," Moscow, 1968, p 3); in Malaya 35 percent (V.A. Zherebilov, "Malaysia's Foreign Economic Relations," Moscow, 1975, p 29) and in Indonesia 16 percent (A.A. Guber, "Indonesia. Socioeconomic Outlines," Moscow, 1932, p 123); 24 percent of cultivated land belonged to foreigners in Algeria (R.G. Landa, "Upsurge of the Anticolonial Movement in Algeria in 1918-1931," Moscow, 1977, p 32) and 13.2 percent in Egypt (L.A. Fridman, "Egypt 1882-1952: Socioeconomic Structure of the Countryside," Moscow, 1973, p 61).
5. For calculations for individual countries see V.S. Glukhoded, "Problems of Iran's Economic Development," Moscow, 1968, p 11; L.A. Fridman, "The Capitalist Development of Egypt (1882-1939)," Moscow, 1963, p 13; JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY, January 1911, p 183; "Report on the Census of India's Foreign Liabilities and Assets as of the 30th June 1948," Bombay, 1950, pp 151-152; "Technical Change, Employment and Investment," Lund, 1982, p 201.
6. See A.D. Novichev, "Outlines of Turkey's Economy Before the World War," Moscow-Leningrad, 1937, p 105.
7. In Ch'ing China a reason for the particularly strong foreign competition, which had a devastating impact on local production, was the fact that carriage dues had been canceled for foreigners--while maintained for Chinese subjects (O.Ye. Nepomnin, "Socioeconomic History of China. 1894-1914," Moscow, 1980, p 152).
8. The Dutch engineer van der Heyde, who visited Thailand in the 1890's, wrote: "The local trades connected with the manufacture of cotton and silk cloth, metal products, paper and pottery are gradually dying out" (quoted from N.Y. Rebrikova, "Outlines of the Recent History of Thailand," Moscow, 1966, p 183). By the end of the 1830's even "chintz imports into Persia had

disastrous consequences for the region itself, whose factories were brought to a state of complete collapse, not being in a position to withstand competition with the cheap productions of European factories" (quoted from V.S. Glukhoded, *Op. cit.*, p 7).

9. Yu.G. Aleksandrov, "Southeast Asia: Problems of Agrarian Evolution," Moscow, 1979, p 41; A.I. Levkovskiy, "Particular Features of the Development of Capitalism in India," Moscow, 1963 p 112; L.A. Fridman, "Egypt 1882-1952...., p 64.
10. In Turkey, for example, with the start of railroad building the European powers began to demand of the Sultan's government a revision of local mining law which corresponded to the interests of capitalist enterprise. However, they only succeeded in having a new mining law enacted in 1907 (A.D. Novichev, *Op. cit.*, p 184) In Thailand regulations governing joint-stock companies and the settlement of questions connected with bankruptcies and other business problems were adopted only in 1892 (N.V. Rebrikova, *Op. cit.*, p 204).
11. The American missionary D. Buchanan wrote that to reduce the degree of risk the owners of the first mechanized enterprises in China took on workers merely to service the machines, while the shops were leased. The lessees hired workers via contractors, and semifinished products were exchanged via the market (D.H. Buchanan, "Development of Capitalistic Enterprise in India," New York, 1934, pp 121-122).
12. The discriminatory activity of the colonial machinery assumed particularly big proportions in Egypt and India, where measures against the national bourgeoisie began to be applied as of the end of the 19th century (see "Development of Industry of Independent India," Moscow, 1964, p 12; L.A. Fridman, "Capitalist Development of Egypt. 1882-1939," Moscow, 1963, p 152).
13. A.D. Novichev. *Op. cit.*, p 101; A.V. Meliksetov, "Bureaucratic Capital in China," Moscow, 1972, p 47; S.S. Grikurov, "Industry of Modern Thailand," Moscow, 1975, p 22; I.I. Pamokaytis, "Iran's Economic Development," Moscow, 1965, p 12.
14. "An endeavor to organize economic modernization mainly and, for the most part, through the hands of the state as a state and not a private matter" was characteristic, for example, of Chinese ideologists (see G.D. Sukharchuk, "Socioeconomic Views of China's Leading Ideologists of the First Half of the 20th Century. Comparative Analysis and Critique" ((doctoral thesis)), Moscow, 1980, pp 83-84).
15. "The purveyors of the ideas of the bourgeois-democratic movement in Siam as of the end of the 19th century were the European-educated officials (both civilian and military). It would be most accurate to call them the noble intelligentsia" (E.O. Berzin, "History of Thailand," Moscow, 1973, p 218). With certain reservations this description may be extended to the leadership of the bourgeois revolutions which occurred in other dependent countries.

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SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL SEEN WEAKENING SINCE 1973 WAR

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[Article by V.Ya. Shveytser: "The Socialist International and the Near East Conflict"]

[Text] Events in the Near East connected with Israeli aggression have for a long time been at the center of the attention of West European social democracy, which occupies important positions in the capitalist power system. Right up to the 1973 Near East war the biggest social democratic parties and the Socialist International (SI) headed by their leaders were on the side of Israel in the conflict.¹ This was explained primarily by the fact that the governments in office in Israel were one-party or coalition governments headed by the Labor Party, whose leaders--D. Ben-Gurion and G. Meir--were active figures in the Socialist International.

With the fourth Arab-Israeli war, which erupted in October 1973, the era of the predominance of the pro-Israel policy in circles of the leading parties which are members of the SI came to an end. A period of quest for ways of more flexible maneuvering between the interests of Israel and its Arab neighbors began. The decisive circumstance influencing the position of social democracy was the Arab OPEC members' threat to impose an oil embargo in respect of West Europe. By the end of 1973 even this threat had assumed a real form--the cutoff of oil supplies to the United States and the Netherlands, which had actively supported Israel at the time of the war. We would note that the Netherlands Government was at that time headed by the social democratic Labor Party. The economic aspect of the "oil problem" consisted for social democracy primarily in the fact that the Arab countries' actions could have seriously undermined its hopes of implementing on the eve and at the outset of the 1970's a "strategy of reforms" aimed at the solution of certain of West Europe's socioeconomic problems.

The volte-face in the Near East conflict was also dictated by another motive, which had become very important for the SI at the start of the 1970's. Having advocated the development of the detente process in Europe and a halt to the war in Indochina, social democracy could not remain aloof from the quest for ways to ease tension in the Near East. Seeing the Arab-Israeli conflict as a principal factor of the destabilization of international life, leaders of the SI recognized the danger of the great powers' involvement in this conflict.

The avowedly pro-Israel policy was also contrary to the SI's set goal of expanding the ranks of its organization thanks to political movements of the emergent states. Israel's aggressive policy had been condemned by Asian and Latin American states, and an absolute majority of African countries had broken off all relations with it following the 1973 October war. The SI could not have failed to have taken this into consideration for otherwise all prospects of introducing political forces of Asian, African and Latin American countries to the social democratic movement would have been forfeited.

Following the changing political conditions surrounding the events in the Near East, the leaders of social democracy correlated their policy with the position adopted in the new situation by the Common Market. And this organization, taking account of the reality of an oil embargo, noted in its statement on the Near East of 6 November 1973 the impermissibility of Israel's seizure of Arab land and the need for the liberation of the territories captured by the Israelis at the time of the 1967 war. Fundamental significance was attached to the recognition of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights recorded in the statement; it declared the right of all countries of this region to live in peace and within secure borders.

Five days after this statement was adopted, the SI convened a special conference in London. As distinct from past years, the leaders of West European social democracy greeted without particular enthusiasm the speech thereat of G. Meir. The latter was particularly sharp in her opposition to the creation of a Palestinian state. Although in view of the disagreements between the representatives of certain parties which came to light the conference was unable to draw up any joint document, "a new tune was heard thereat for the first time: dialogue with the Arabs,"² the journal DIE ZUKUNFT, the organ of the Austrian Socialist Party, wrote, commenting on the results of the London meeting.

The entire set of factors and circumstances which had prompted the SI to pay greater attention to the interests of the Arab countries also demanded certain organizational efforts. There thus emerged as "study group" which was to visit the Arab countries, ascertain their viewpoint on the question of economic cooperation with West Europe and also test the ground concerning the possibility of membership of the SI or of some other form of cooperation therewith on the part of certain political parties of this region. The group was made up of prominent representatives of social democracy from the FRG, Sweden, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Japan and Italy. It was headed by then Austrian Chancellor B. Kreisky; back in the 1960's it was he who had raised the question of social democracy's more balanced approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need for consideration of the fundamental interests of both contending sides.

In 1974-1976 the "Kreisky group" visited all the countries involved in this form or the other in the Near East conflict. B. Kreisky and his colleagues met with the leading politicians of the Arab world; the fact that B. Kreisky, in spite of the protests of Israel's Labor Party, established personal contact with Y. Arafat was particularly important.

Initially the "Kreisky group" encountered certain difficulties. B. Kreisky himself spoke about this thus several years later: "My first trip to the Near East in 1974... was accompanied by spiteful commentaries from Israel. In the first country which I visited in the course of this trip--Egypt--I also encountered a hostile attitude. My interlocutors at the talks in Egypt accused us of everything: of French Premier Guy Mollet's intervention in Suez and of dissociating the socialists from the Algerian war for independence."³

To a considerable extent thanks to B. Kreisky's diplomatic experience, the mission which he headed succeeded in a thorough discussion of the problem with the majority of its Arab interlocutors. The representatives of the SI were forced to acknowledge here the soundness of many of the Arab countries' demands and to advocate ways to solve the Near East problem which were at variance not only with Israel's position but also with what the SI had declared previously.

Evidence of this evolution is the report which B. Kreisky submitted to the SI leadership following the "study group's" third trip to the Near East (1976). Evaluating the prospects for peace in the Near East, the report posed as the principal condition thereof Israel's return to the "1967 borders". The report spoke of the right of all peoples involved in the conflict to live within stable state borders and emphasized the importance of a solution of the Palestinian problem with regard for the Palestinians' sovereign rights. "It is now impossible to deny the Palestinians' right to speak on their own behalf against their will."⁴ The attempts at backstage bargaining over the Palestinian problem were thereby condemned, although, as time has shown, social democracy has far from always adhered to this principle.

What seems extraordinarily important is the place of the report which evaluated the PLO and contained recommendations that social democracy abandon its prejudice toward the PLO. "We have reached the conclusion," the authors of the report observed, "that socialist parties' denial of the PLO's existence is not only ineffective but is engendering a feeling of new hostility of the Arab world to the social democratic movement."⁵ Simultaneously the report attempted to outline paths of a rapprochement between the ruling parties of the Arab East and the Israeli Labor Party; the mediator here could be, the authors of the report believe, the SI. "Reconciliation between Arab parties and the SI could be an important prerequisite of the creation of a new situation conducive to a dialogue between the Arab parties and the Israeli Labor Party."⁶

The SI's Near East policy in this period cannot be viewed outside of the context of such actions being undertaken at different levels in the mid-1970's. We would point, for example, to such important facts as the convening at the end of December 1973 of the Near East Peace Conference in Geneva and the disengagement of troops of Egypt and Israel in Sinai. Also obvious was the contribution of the United Nations, particularly the adoption by the UN General Assembly 29th Session of the resolution which recognized the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, national independence and sovereignty. Tremendous repercussions worldwide were caused by the decision to grant the PLO permanent-observer status at the United Nations.

In shaping the SI's "new policy" on the Near East the leaders of West European social democracy were also forced to take account of the fundamentally new circumstances which emerged in 1977. First, in May 1977 in Israel for the first time in 30 years the Labor Party was removed from the helm of the machinery of state and the Likud bloc of far-right parties headed by M. Begin took office. Second, following prolonged pressure on the part of American diplomacy, Egyptian President A. Sadat paid in November of the same year what the West called a "historic" visit to Tel Aviv, which became the start of separate negotiations of the leaders of the two countries. Third, thanks to the efforts of the USSR, the United States agreed to the signing in October 1977 of a Soviet-American statement on the Near East which contained realistic premises for a settlement of the problem, primarily--recognition of the importance of continuation of the Geneva Peace Conference. Finally, in June 1977 the Common Market issued an important decision: it noted in more specific wording than hitherto the need to grant the Palestinians the "right to a fatherland" as a basic condition of a solution of the conflict.

The social democrats endeavored in this period to find their own ways of solving the Near East problem which corresponded, they believed, to the requirements of the moment. The SI leadership considered one such the organization of meetings with Arab leaders both within the SI framework and beyond this framework, given the obligatory participation of leaders of Israel's Labor Party. The latter's electoral defeat was regarded as a transient feature. However, the leaders of the SI expected from the Israeli Labor Party a departure from the previous rigid positions and emphatic dissociation from the policy of the Likud bloc. It was precisely such that B. Kreisky's opinion that "Israel's Labor Party will formulate new alternatives since it will hardly wish to represent the policy of the rightwing parties"⁷ expressed at the Madrid (October 1977) session of the SI Bureau should have been understood. The above-mentioned session adopted the decision to organize in February 1978 under the aegis of the SI a special Near East conference whose proclaimed purpose was assisting the Geneva Peace Conference's efforts in the search for ways to solve the Near East problem. It should, however, be noted that the SI leaders were at that period impressed by the Soviet-American statement on the Near East; the majority of them could not have supposed that a month later A. Sadat would unexpectedly visit Tel Aviv, opening by this step the way to separate negotiations with Israel. At the same time certain prominent social democrats knew that the Egyptian president would seek, while observing great caution, it is true, an opportunity to begin such negotiations.

B. Kreisky's article in the West German magazine DER STERN (August 1982), in which he reported that back at the start of May 1977 A. Sadat, receiving him in Cairo, spoke of his intention of meeting representatives of European and American Jewish communities, could serve as grounds for this assertion. "During this nighttime conversation," Kreisky writes, "Sadat instructed me to say to the head of the Israeli Government, S. Peres, that if he won the impending parliamentary elections, there could be a meeting between them, and then a solution would most likely be found."⁸ Considering this information, which B. Kreisky kept secret for more than 5 years, his almost ecstatic reaction to Sadat's visit to Tel Aviv may be understood. Nor did many other social democratic figures conceal their admiration for Sadat's actions.

The social democrats held a "roundtable conference" on the Near East on 12 February 1978 in Vienna. Conceived originally as an action in support of the Geneva forum, it became under the new conditions of kind of lifebuoy for Sadat, for whom it was extremely important to win the support of the social democrats at a time when the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations could have become deadlocked owing to the intransigence of M. Begin, who did not agree even to the abridged version of a solution of the Palestinian problem proposed by J. Carter. We would note in this connection that on B. Kreisky's initiative A. Sadat met S. Peres in Salzburg a day prior to the opening of the conference; in the evening of the same 11 February the leader of Israel's Labor Party had a conversation with F. Mohieddin, general secretary of the Arab Socialist Union.

However, in spite of the SI leaders' hopes, the Vienna "roundtable" manifestly revealed rough edges. And the main one of these was precisely the Palestine question. First, the majority of participants in the forum did not agree with S. Peres, who refused to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the entire Palestinian people. Second, many of the participants in the discussion rejected the kind of surrogate Palestinian national home proposed by S. Peres within the framework of the Jordanian state. Nor was there full support for the leader of Israel's Labor Party's arguments that the Begin government's efforts aimed at the achievement of a separate treaty with Egypt should not be impeded. According to the account of Viennese papers, S. Peres' position was approved only by the representatives of the Netherlands Labor Party and the British Labor Party. It was sharply criticized by the delegates from the Spanish socialists and the Swedish social democrats. A certain "centrist" position was occupied by the principal organizer of the meeting, B. Kreisky. Having advocated the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories they were occupying, the chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party at the same time was extremely vague in outlining the problem of the creation of a Palestinian state. Having noted the importance of PLO participation in peace negotiations, he did not dissociate himself from the disparagement of this organization's political representativeness.⁹

The endeavor of a number of social democratic leaders to support separate paths of a solution of the Near East problem has made its mark on the SI's subsequent actions. We would point in this connection to the quadripartite meeting at the start of July 1978 in Vienna of W. Brandt, B. Kreisky, S. Peres and A. Sadat. The statement adopted after this meeting, which was signed by W. Brandt and B. Kreisky, left not even a shadow of doubt as to the paths of a solution of the Near East problem toward which the authoritative SI leaders wished to orient social democracy. The statement contained an appeal to the governments of Egypt and Israel to continue the negotiations and bring them to the conclusion of a peace agreement. The statement did not give a single word to the importance of a peace conference at which all the interested parties would be represented. A departure from previous positions was also contained in the question of the withdrawal of Israeli forces; it spoke not of their immediate withdrawal from all territories they had captured from the Arabs but merely of their withdrawal "to secure borders"; concerning the questions of the Palestinians' participation in peace negotiations, the authors of the statement failed to mention the PLO. Only in the most general words was there mention of some "representatives of the Palestinian people" who should participate in a "solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects."¹⁰

The SI leaders sought their organization's consent to the line they had adopted. The approval at the Paris session of the SI Bureau (September 1978) of the above-mentioned Brandt-Kreisky statement, in particular, testified to this. Following stormy debates, the bureau turned down the proposal of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party on inviting a PLO delegation to the 14th SI Congress as an observer; on the other hand, it was decided to grant observer status at the congress to representatives of Sadat's National Democratic Party. The 14th SI Congress in November 1978 in Vancouver also showed that the social democratic leaders wished for the speediest conclusion of a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. They welcomed the documents adopted at the Carter, Sadat and Begin Camp David meeting in September 1978 and did not conceal their "ardent hopes" for their speediest approval both by Egypt and Israel. In his speech at the congress W. Brandt expressed confidence that Egypt and Israel "will with a sense of responsibility and resolve with the minimum loss of time proceed along their chosen path toward a settled peace." Only in the most general form did Brandt speak of his conviction that "a satisfactory solution corresponding to the Palestinian Arabs' legitimate interests will also be found."¹¹ In the Main Resolution adopted by the 14th Congress the separate deal is put forward as an example of the "endeavor to achieve peace," and "openly and unambiguously supporting those participating in this process"¹² is declared the task of the social democratic parties.

The negative reaction of almost all the Arab states to the separate Egyptian-Israeli peace concluded in March 1979 led to a certain differentiation in social democracy's views of the ways to solve the Near East problem. Some SI leaders perceived the very fact of the conclusion of a separate peace with approval. Others assumed the precariousness of the Camp David deal. Very sharp objections to the Egyptian-Israeli deal were also expressed. Thus the Spanish Socialist Workers Party issued a special communique which said bluntly that such an agreement "cannot serve a peaceful solution of the Near East conflict for it fails to take account of the interests of all sides, primarily the Palestinians."¹³

In this period the SI leaders had to take the path of official contacts with the PLO leadership. The level of contacts was raised. W. Brandt and B. Kreisky sent Y. Arafat a proposal for a meeting, which was held at the start of July 1979 in Vienna. A communique was issued on the conclusion of the talks which emphasized the right of the Arab people of Palestine to the creation of their own state. This position was counterposed to the plans of the abridged "administrative autonomy" which had been promised the Palestinians by the participants in the Camp David deal.

However, the ice of mistrust toward the PLO which had existed for many years in the SI, not without the influence of Israel's Labor Party, could not be melted all at once. The SI Bureau session in Lisbon (November 1979) testified that prejudices and accretions of the past still remained quite tenacious in the social democratic environment. Despite the demand of some parties (particularly the Spanish Socialist Workers Party), it was again decided to refrain from admitting PLO observers to representative social democratic forums. Without being specific on the question of who was speaking from the previous positions, SI General Secretary B. Carlsson confined himself in his report at the 15th SI Congress (Madrid, November 1980) to the statement that "unity is lacking on the specific question of the PLO in the views of the SI's members."¹⁴

Nonetheless, the Lisbon session was not a simple repetition of what had occurred a year earlier at the analogous session in Paris. First, the results of the meeting of W. Brandt and B. Kreisky with Y. Arafat were approved. In an interview with the Italian weekly L'ESPRESSO W. Brandt pointed out that in Lisbon "the identical opinion of the overwhelming majority of SI members concerning... the PLO as an important factor in the process of the establishment of peace in the Near East was revealed."¹⁵ Second, it was recommended that the upcoming 15th SI Congress admit to the SI Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party, which cooperates closely with the PLO--it was thereby assigned the role, as it were, of unofficial PLO representative in the SI.

How to explain the certain contradictoriness of the SI's position in its attitude toward the PLO? Two circumstances were decisive on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's. On the one hand the irreconcilability of Israel's Labor Party, which continued to assure the members of the SI that negotiations could not be conducted with "Arafat's terrorists". The SI could not fail to take account of the Israeli Labor Party's opinion, the more so in that its leaders had not abandoned hopes for their Israeli colleagues' speedy return to office.

On the other, social democracy could not fail to take into consideration the fact that many sober-minded bourgeois figures of West Europe recognize the PLO de facto, showing thereby their reluctance to farm out the Near East problem to the United States and its satellites--Egypt and Israel--entirely. Attempts were made within the EEC framework to find some alternative to Camp David. We would mention in this connection the well-known "Venice Declaration" on the Near East adopted in June 1980 at a session of the Common Market's European Council. This document pointed to the desirability of the enlistment of the PLO in all negotiations on a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict (a proposition which is not, of course, the equivalent of recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people).

The absence in the ranks of social democracy of a scrupulous approach free of ambiguity to the Near East problem was also demonstrated by the 15th SI Congress. The vagueness and uncertainty of the social democrats' position was reflected in W. Brandt's report. The SI, he said, is ready at the appropriate time to exert new efforts to "provide a guarantee for Israel's existence, grant the Palestinian people rights and contribute to the conclusion of peace treaties within this region and with it."¹⁶ Expressing himself more precisely on the Palestinian problem was B. Kreisky, who emphasized that the Palestinian people have the right to self-determination and that the PLO has the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinians since this organization is the representative of the Palestinian people. He linked the question of the achievement of peace in the Near East region with a change of cabinet in Israel; according to him, "only the assumption of office in Israel of the Labor Party can change the situation there."¹⁷

During the congress, but outside of its framework W. Brandt and B. Kreisky met with Labor Party leader S. Peres and B. Ghalil, who represented Sadat's National Democratic Party at the congress as observer. The result of this quadripartite meeting was the special document "Statement on the Near East". The Leitmotiv

of the "document of the four" was a defense of "President Sadat's courageous approach" to a solution of the region's problems, that is, exaltation of the path of separate deals. In a highly transparent form neighboring countries, primarily Jordan, were called upon to take the path of Camp David. The Palestinian problem was spoken of in the most general words; also highly indeterminate was the mention of the possibility of social democracy playing an "active part" in the business of achieving peace.¹⁸

However, the "statement of the four" did not reflect the viewpoint of all participants in the Madrid congress. A group of representatives of SI members submitted a kind of counterresolution for the congress' examination. Prepared by the Spanish and Italian socialists, the draft resolution, which was supported by the SI members from Austria, Chile, El Salvador, Malta, the Dominican Republic, Senegal and Venezuela ("Declaration of the Near East"), placed the accents differently than the "Statement on the Near East". It stated the "lack of clear prospects of the achievement of universal peace in the Near East." The path to peace, the draft said, lies via negotiations with the participation of all interested parties. A necessary participant therein should be the PLO, "which represents the Palestinian people and is broadly recognized at the international level."¹⁹

The above-mentioned draft was not adopted at the congress for it was categorically opposed by the representatives of Israel's Labor Party. The Near East problem was reflected in the final resolution of the congress and was interpreted, moreover, in a spirit very close to the "statement of the four". Israel's Labor Party was declared the sole force capable of ensuring peace for Israel. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people were only barely mentioned in a subordinate clause; not a word was said about the PLO.²⁰

The contradictoriness and inconsistency of the position of the SI leaders was explained by the fact that they were constructing their own policy in the Near East conflict, proceeding not from some definite principles but from circumstances of a situational-tactical nature. The events of the following year of 1981 canceled out many of their calculations. First, the parliamentary elections in Israel did not bring success to the Labor Party, on the more moderate policy of which compared with the Likud bloc the SI had been counting. Second, the assassination in October 1981 of President A. Sadat created an extremely uncertain situation in the business of implementation of the Camp David accords. Finally, the assumption of office in the United States of the New Republican administration, which immediately embarked on an exacerbation of international affairs, did not give social democracy grounds for optimism. Meanwhile the crisis situation in the world economy which had arisen anew at the start of the 1980's again reminded many West Europeans of the impossibility of not considering in the solution of any question concerning the Near East the National interests of the Arab oil-exporting countries.

Nor could social democracy remain impartial to Israel's aggression in Lebanon and to the genocide in respect of the Palestinians perpetrated on the territory of a sovereign state by the Zionist aggressors. The Begin government's disregard for the generally accepted rules of international law, UN decisions and the demands and protests of the international community--all this elicited an extremely negative reaction in the SI members.

We would note that together with protest resolutions against Israel's new acts of aggression adopted by many social democratic parties individual parties in the SI and figures thereof for the first time throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict, perhaps, drew a parallel in their statements between the actions of the Israeli hawks on the occupied territories and the outrages of the fascists during World War II. In an interview with the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN B. Kreisky in particular termed Israel's actions in Lebanon "fascist policy."²¹ An explosion of anger was elicited in many representatives of social democracy by the carnage of monstrous scale organized in the Palestine refugee camps. A statement by J. den Uyl, leader of Holland's social democrats, made on behalf of the Union of Socialist Parties of the EEC, emphatically condemned the crimes committed in West Beirut. The fact that the social democrats also pointed out the main culprits of the bloody program also catches the attention: in an interview with Austria's ARBEITER ZEITUNG W. Brandt emphasized that responsibility for this act of genocide is borne by the Israeli Government.²²

A consequence of the Israeli aggression in Lebanon was an appreciable reassessment in West European social democracy circles of the attitude toward a member of the SI--Israel's Labor Party. Whereas earlier it had been regarded as a force capable of a more realistic approach to the Near East problem than that of the bloc headed by Begin, the Israeli Labor Party's refusal from the very outset to dissociate itself from the attack on Lebanon, more, its support for the action in Lebanon "confined to 40 kilometers"--all this gave rise to outrage in social democratic circles. The representatives of the socialist parties of Austria and Spain and also certain social democrats in Switzerland and Sweden demanded discussion of the question of the Israeli Labor Party's expulsion from the SI. Leading figures of the socialist parties of Portugal and France were, however, opposed to such a radical step.

The differentiation pertaining to the set of questions of a Near East settlement was also manifested very distinctly at the intraparty level. Thus a foreign policy program document drawn up by the British Labor Party's Executive Committee even prior to Israel's aggression in Lebanon contained ambiguous wording. It expressed solidarity with "the Palestinian people's struggle for self-determination," and at the same time the activity of the PLO was termed "terrorist"; there was also recognition of the "historic significance of the Camp David accords." Subsequently, however, signs of Labor Party members' retreat from this position were manifested. The Labor Party's annual conference held at the end of September 1982 adopted a "special resolution on the Near East"; it no longer contained the above-mentioned wording and stated the Labor Party members' recognition of the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, without which a Near East settlement cannot be achieved." There was support for "the creation of a democratic Palestinian state for the purpose of a long-term solution of the Palestinian problem." We would note that it was the first time that Labor Party members had employed such emphasis officially. At the same time, however, certain leading figures of the party opposed the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution in every possible way.

The discussions which ensued in connection with the events in Lebanon again demonstrated the disagreements in the approach both of individual figures of the SI member-parties and of the parties as a whole to key questions of the Near East problem. This applies, inter alia, to the question of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. In principle all leading figures of the SI are in favor of this right, and it is also recorded in certain of this

organization's documents and reflected in resolutions and programs adopted in recent years by social democratic parties. But this problem is specified variously. For example, Britain's Labor Party members support the Palestinians' right to a sovereign state. This position is also reflected in the foreign policy section of the election manifesto published by Spain's socialists in October 1982. B. Kreisky and Greek PASOK leader A. Papandreou speak of a sovereign Palestinian state as a most important component of a Near East settlement. At the same time, however, the leadership of such influential SI parties as the SPD and French Socialist Party expresses itself less definitely on this score, preferring the term "Palestinians' right to a homeland."

The social democrats' views on the PLO's role in the process of a peace settlement differ. In SI circles as a whole there is recognition of the need for the enlistment of the PLO in future talks; however, not all social democratic leaders are ready for official recognition of this organization. In any event, only the socialist-headed Austrian and Greek governments have granted the PLO full diplomatic status. The leadership of certain SI parties sets the PLO preliminary conditions. Thus F. Mitterrand has made France's recognition of the PLO dependent on the extent to which the PLO is ready to recognize Israel and completely renounce armed methods of struggle.²³ A similar viewpoint is held by the SPD leadership also. And this under the conditions of the Israeli occupiers' continued genocide against Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Disagreements in the social democratic camp on the question of the ways and methods of solving the Near East conflict broke out on the surface in connection with the decision adopted by the SI at the start of August 1982 to create within it its framework a special new Near East working group. It is now no longer headed by B. Kreisky, but M. Soares, who holds to more loyal positions in respect of Israel and the Labor Party. As far as B. Kreisky is concerned, he explained thus in an article carried in the West German magazine DER STERN the reasons for his abandonment of the role of peacemaker. Israel, he emphasized, following the aggression in Lebanon, has morally exposed itself: "I no longer wish to have anything to do with this Israel." "I refuse," Kreisky wrote, "to perform in the future the role of mediator to which I so long aspired and decline bridge building between the Palestinians and Israelis. After all, my positions no longer lie somewhere in the middle. I have become partial, namely: I am on the side of the persecuted and oppressed, and this is in line with my socialist beliefs."²⁴

As it transpires, M. Soares also views the prospects of the peacemaking efforts of the working group which he heads without particular enthusiasm. The SI, he believes, "has no big opportunities for intervening" and is forced to confine itself merely to expressing its opinion and counsel of a general nature and so forth. At the same time, however, M. Soares asserted that "the recent events in Lebanon have contributed to the determination of the SI's mean common line."²⁵

What did M. Soares mean by this "common line"? After all, as was shown above, neither on the question of the PLO nor on the problem of a Palestinian state has social democracy reached a uniform opinion. Nor does one exist in the SI's

attitude toward Israel's Labor Party. Merely the unity of West Europe's social democratic parties in the positive appraisal of the mission undertaken by the "multinational forces" in Lebanon may be noted. In addition, the French contingent was sent to Lebanon on the personal initiative of F. Mitterrand, while members of the Italian Socialist Party who are ministers approved the dispatch of Italian soldiers to Lebanon.

For a characterization of social democracy's continued highly contradictory position in respect of a settlement of the Near East problem importance is attached to the approval by the West European parties of the SI of the "Reagan plan," which was promulgated in September 1982. Having exultantly evaluated the "Reagan initiative" as "realistic," M. Soares asserted, for example, that the U.S. President's proposals contain a multitude of positive elements which concur with the proposals put forward at that time by Arab leaders at the meeting in Fez.²⁶ Such laudatory appraisals unduly exaggerate the significance of the U.S. President's purely verbal acknowledgments of the importance of satisfying the Palestinians' national aspirations. As is known, R. Reagan does not go any further than highly limited "administrative autonomy". The need for the creation of an independent Palestinian state was clearly spoken of in Fez, however. Nor does Reagan make any mention of the PLO, which is recognized by the Arab countries and now by European social democracy itself also as a necessary and plenipotentiary participant in a peaceful settlement of the Near East conflict. As far as the main reason determining social democracy's benevolence toward the "Reagan plan" is concerned, its roots should evidently be sought in the line adopted by the leaders of West European countries in respect of the actions of the Republican administration. While dissociating itself from its most odious steps, social democracy supports even the most ostentatious, as in this case, departure of the United States from the previous rigid goals in the sphere of a Near East settlement.

While having given the "Reagan plan" a positive appraisal, social democracy essentially passed by in silence the new Near East proposals put forward by the USSR in September 1982. They emphasized anew the need for the return to the Arab countries of all the territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and spoke of ensuring the Arab people of Palestine the right to self-determination and the creation of an independent state; it should also include East Jerusalem. The Soviet proposals pointed to the importance of ensuring the secure and independent existence of all states of the Near East region and the need for an end to the state of war between the Arab countries, including the future Palestinian state, and Israel. The question of international guarantees of a peace settlement was raised; this question could be settled by way of collective efforts with the participation of all interested parties with the indispensable participation of the PLO--the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine.²⁷

The basic provisions of the new Soviet initiative are not at variance with what has recently been proposed by certain SI leaders. As far as the "position of silence" for which they have opted in respect of these proposals, it serves as further confirmation of the contradictoriness of social democratic concepts. While understanding the inevitability of the involvement of the USSR, in this form or the other, in the process of a Near East settlement, the SI leaders

at the same time are reluctant to recognize the constructive nature of the Soviet initiative. This approach reflects an aspiration, common for the SI, to impede the growth of the USSR's authority and influence in the Near East region.

The position of West European social democracy on the issue in question underwent a certain evolution on the eve and at the outset of the 1980's. Despite all the contradictoriness and inconsistency of the SI's policy and the disagreements, at times quite serious, between the leaders of leading members of this international organization, new features attesting a more sober, realistic approach to events in the Near East have become apparent. The purely apologetic attitude toward Israel as an islet of "Western democracy" in the Near East region has been replaced by a highly critical evaluation thereof. Instead of total solidarity with the policy of a member of the SI--Israel's Labor Party--there is now a quite sharp dissociation from its approach to the conflict with its Arab neighbors. The positions of these countries are not now ignored; in formulating its own policy the SI is taking account of the demands formulated in leading circles of the countries of the Arab East. Having recognized political realities, the SI leaders now note the paramount importance of a solution of the Palestinian problem, although they sometimes differ in their opinions in a determination of the actual paths of the solution thereof. Finally, the obvious growth of the authority and influence of the PLO has forced social democracy to recognize, with certain reservations, it is true, the PLO's right to represent the interests of the Arab people of Palestine in the process of a peaceful settlement of the Near East problem. The as a whole positive evolution of the views of social democracy, reflecting certain shifts of a political, socioeconomic and ideological nature, is rooted in actions characteristic of the reformist part of the workers movement in the last decade.

The aspiration to do its bit in the process of a peaceful settlement of the Near East conflict is written into the general canvas of social democratic activeness in international affairs. Supporting at the start-middle of the 1970's the development of the detente process and subsequently opposing the undermining of detente by the aggressive actions of the U.S. Republican administration, the SI leaders proceed primarily from the interests of West Europe, where the social democrats are a major political force. Holding, for the most part, to the positions of sober-minded European politicians, the leaders of social democracy are evaluating realistically the socioeconomic consequences of Near East tension. The direct link between the energy problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict forced the Common Market, in whose executive bodies the social democrats also play an important part, to present a number of initiatives different, despite all their ambiguity, from the policy pursued by Washington.²⁸ In the conflict between the two "power centers" of the capitalist world--West Europe and the United States--which has been exacerbated with the intensification of the economic crisis and the complication of the international situation, social democracy has with all certainty taken the side of the West European "center".

It would be wrong, however, not to see also the difference which exists in the policy of West Europe's social democracy and the European political forces to

the right of social democracy. The latter approach the Near East problem mainly as a factor of world economics and politics, not considering its ideological component. The social democrats, who in the last decade have increasingly emphasized the "basic values" of "democratic socialism," cannot permit themselves this. They view the question of solidarity with the Arab liberation movement in the context of these values. In advocating a strengthening of this solidarity social democracy is endeavoring to win the support of the progressive public, whose sympathies in the Near East conflict are on the side of the Arab peoples. At the same time forces are operating in the social democratic, as, equally, in the bourgeois, parties of West Europe which are, as before, oriented toward Israel. Organizationally they are united in corresponding Friends of Israel societies, and in certain countries, furthermore, these societies even have a supraparty coloration.

Waging a struggle for ideological-political influence on the Arab world, social democracy adheres to the proposition that at the present time the countries of this region are not yet, as distinct from Israel, "ripe" for the perception of "democratic socialism". The SI leaders' greatest concern is caused here not by the countries which have opted for the path of capitalist development, preserving elements of feudalism, but the states which have declared their allegiance to a socialist orientation and which proceed in their domestic and foreign policy from the national interests of their peoples. Endeavoring to turn them away from this "dangerous" orientation, the leaders of social democracy are striving to weaken the friendship and cooperation linking certain Arab countries with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

All this quite complex set of subjective and objective factors is undoubtedly influencing the political course being formulated by social democracy, on the Near East problem included. Endeavoring to turn the SI from a "Eurocentrist" into an international organization, its leaders have been forced to reckon with the position with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict occupied by the new participants in this organization--Asian, African and Latin American political movements which are highly varied in their ideological-political orientation--which have become a part of the SI in the last decade. The latter, with a few exceptions, are firmly on the side of the Arab states in the Near East confrontation. These real contradictions in which the leaders of social democracy are operating are the cause of the amorphousness and uncertainty of the SI's political platform on the Near East problem.

FOOTNOTES

1. For the SI's policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict from the end of the 1940's through the start of the 1970's see L.Ya. Dadiani, "Social Democracy, Zionism and the Near East Question" in VOPROSY ISTORII No 7, 1975, pp 78-94; *ibid.*, "The Communist Parties and the SI's Attitude Toward Zionism and Israel's Aggression" in "Communists and Contemporary Social Democracy," Moscow, 1975, pp 204-237.

2. DIE ZUKUNFT Nos 23-24, 1973, p 16.
3. DER STERN No 35, 1982, p 174.
4. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1978, p 9.
5. Ibid., p 10.
6. Ibid., p 12.
7. ARBEITER ZEITUNG 17 October 1977.
8. DER STERN No 35, 1982, p 175.
9. See DIE PRESSE 13 February 1978; KURIER 13 February 1978; ARBEITER ZEITUNG 14 February 1978.
10. ARBEITER ZEITUNG 11 July 1978.
11. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1979, p 8.
12. Ibid., p 26.
13. EL SOCIALISTA 1 April 1979.
14. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1981, p 14.
15. L'ESPRESSO 9 December 1979.
16. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1981, p 9.
17. ARBEITER ZEITUNG 22 November 1980.
18. SOCIALIST AFFAIRS No 1, 1981, p 20.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p 22.
21. See PRAVDA 6 September 1982.
22. ARBEITER ZEITUNG 22 September 1982.
23. LE MONDE 19 August 1982.
24. DER STERN No 35, 1982, p 175.
25. LE MONDE 25 September 1982.
26. IL MESSAGGERO 21 September 1982.

27. PRAVDA 16 September 1982.

28. We would mention, for example, a resolution adopted by the European Parliament in January 1983 on the initiative of the faction of social democratic members which recognized the Palestinians' right to create their own state.

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PROGRESSIVE, REGRESSIVE POLITICAL FEATURES SEEN IN MUSLIM RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

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[Article by M.T. Stepanyants: "'Muslim Revivalism'"]

[Text] The important role being performed by "Muslim" currents at the current stage of the ideological struggle makes it possible to express an opinion about some "renaissance" of Islam. It should, however, be borne in mind that the term "renaissance" is in itself highly conditional. It would be a mistake to perceive it in a way that indicated that it is a question of a new birth of a "dead" dogma. The "Islamic factor" has to this extent or the other constantly maintained a certain role in the history of the development of the Muslim peoples. Nonetheless, the extent of its influence has not always been identical, such that at times it might even have seemed that the dogma of the prophet Mohammed had lost its power over the minds of millions of Muslims.¹ Proceeding from this, by "Islamic renaissance" should evidently be understood the restoration of temporarily weakened religious activism.

R.A. Ul'yanovskiy draws attention to the fact that the term "Islamic renaissance" is used "to designate heterogeneous social phenomena in the Muslim world: from the counterrevolutionary pro-imperialist activity of the Muslim Brotherhood and its kindred organizations in Afghanistan, Syria and other countries through mass revolutionary anti-imperialist movements like those which shook Iran in 1978-1979."² Indeed, "Islamic renaissance" is manifested in the use of religious slogans by the overwhelming majority of political parties and organizations, which at times express the interests of opposite classes and social strata. But, perhaps, most adequate to this phenomenon is the school of social thought which may be called "Muslim revivalism".

An examination of "Muslim revivalism" in comparison with the basic types of contemporary Muslim ideological currents--orthodoxy, modernism and reformatism--contributes, it seems to us, to the ascertainment of its true content. Two criteria are made the basis of this typologization. One is of a formal nature. It is a question of the attitude of each type of the above-mentioned currents toward Muslim dogmatics. However, inasmuch as the interpretation of the foundations of dogma is subordinated to the task of substantiating with the help of traditional religion the positions on the fundamental problem of the contemporary "Muslim world"--that of determination of the further path of development--the main criterion of the typologization is the class-social thrust of the interpretation of Muslim dogmatics.

The enumerated types of religious current have been revealed and studied to this extent or the other in Soviet and foreign literature, nonetheless, there exists on this question a terminological and ideological inconsistency impeding a more in-depth comprehension of the ideological processes occurring in the social life of the Muslim countries. The total identification of modernism with reformatism, reformism with reformatism and orthodoxy with renaissance (which is further called traditionalism, renewal, fundamentalism revivalism) and so forth may be cited as an example.

The classes and groups connected with precapitalist, namely, patriarchal-communal and feudal, social relations represent the social basis of orthodoxy. Although the rural commune and feudal land tenure in Asian and African countries have undergone "appreciable changes under the pressure of commodity-capitalist production and as a consequence of inclusion in the world market and the implementation of agrarian reforms, nonetheless, the classes and groups expressing these types of relations participate noticeably in national life in many countries and are represented in it ideologically. Furthermore, as the purveyors and defenders of the most conservative forms of economic and social organization, they frequently form the most reactionary school in social ideology. The most reactionary organizations proclaiming theocratic concepts hostile to democracy and progress and propagandizing the ideas of religious exclusiveness rely in their activity precisely on these strata."³

The orthodox insist that the idea of social progress as society's ongoing development brought about by people's efforts is in principle alien to Islam and contrary to its basic principles. They refer primarily here to the proposition concerning the "finiteness of the prophecy" of Mohammed. According to the Koran, Mohammed is "the messenger of Allah and the last of the prophets" (surah 33, ayat 40), which in the orthodox interpretation serves to indicate the perfection of the homily of the Muslim prophet, which does not require any additions or, even less, corrections. The orthodox also refer to the sayings (hadith), one of which, for example, claims that Mohammed once declared: "My attitude toward the long chain of prophets may be understood through the parable of the palace: the palace was built in the best way. Everything had been completed in it, there was just one brick short. I filled the empty spot, and the building of the palace was thereby completed."⁴ If there is no possibility of a need for a change in the dogma of Islam, nor is there any need for improvement and progress in the legal order which it envisages for it is ideal and universal. In addition, the absolute allegiance of the orthodox to the principle of the theological approach permits interpretation of the concept of progress as no more than "the process of realization of the pre-ordained divine purpose."⁵

However paradoxical it may seem, the same proposition concerning the incompatibility of Islam and the ideas of social progress, and with references to the same Koranic tenets, furthermore, is also formally defended by the so-called Muslim modernists. However, they draw the directly opposite conclusion from this proposition. The logic of their arguments is roughly this: inasmuch as Islam not only does not promote but, more, its prescriptions even impede social progress, Muslims should turn to the values of the Western bourgeois world since only they can secure progress and prosperity. As far as Islam is concerned, religion should remain a matter of personal conscience, not pretending to the role of regulator of social relations.

The social base of the modernists in the social-political thought of the countries of the Muslim East is quite narrow. Attributable to it primarily are the comprador bourgeoisie and part of the bureaucracy and intelligentsia which has had a Western education. Nonetheless, given a certain alignment of forces, it is precisely this school which could exert the greatest influence on the pursuit of official government policy. However, it is impossible to solve the urgent problems of the countries lagging in their development with the help of modernist concepts, on the contrary, they contribute to an even greater gap between the elite and the masses and aggravate class conflicts.

The reformists are the opponents of the orthodox, but, as distinct from the modernists, champions of changes in concert with spiritual traditions. Reformatism--a type of religious consciousness typical mainly of the national bourgeoisie--aspires to adapt traditional dogma to the demands of capitalist development. Scientific disputes surrounding the reformation process in Islam, as in other "oriental" religions, are still incessant. The majority of Soviet experts is disposed to evaluate it as a fundamentally new phenomenon of ideological and political life which is bourgeois in essence and for this reason largely identical to the Christian Reformation.

The concept of "reformation" in scientific literature is used in the narrow and broad senses. In the first case the reference is to the Reformation (with a capital "R") as the anti-Catholic, antifeudal movement in Europe in the 16th century which led to the emergence of Protestantism. In the broad sense reformation is a longer process (which began with heresies and the Lollard-type movement in England and continued right up to the 17th century) aimed, as a whole, at the "bourgeoisification" of Christian dogma.⁶ With reference to the processes occurring in Islam in the 19th-20th centuries the use of the term "reformation" in the broad sense of the word seems to us legitimate.

Increasing significance has been attached in recent years in the Muslim world to petty bourgeois religious concepts appearing in the form of so-called revivalism. Although the majority of religious ideologists, including representatives of feudal circles and the national bourgeoisie, speaks of a "revival of the purity of belief," it would seem to us that this term should be applied in respect of the concepts which not simple campaign for an abstract rebirth of the "spirit" of Islam and the past might of Mohammedanism but provide for the restoration and realization in contemporary life of the specific propositions and institutions of early Mohammedanism. "Revivalism" in this understanding proves to be predominantly the religious type of consciousness of the peasantry and the populous "middle" strata, including artisans, small-scale tradesmen and the urban masses. These are the strata of the population which on the one hand feel hatred toward the feudal methods of exploitation and, on the other, suffering from the "costs" of the bourgeois system and the competition of big capital, do not accept capitalism either. While rejecting the recent past, they, endeavoring to realize their cherished aspirations, turn to the distant past, idealizing the early period of Mohammedanism. Whence the idea of national revival through a renaissance of the original purity of belief. Owing to the duality of its attitude toward socioeconomic changes--the desire for them and at the same time dissatisfaction with them if they are manifested in the conventional forms of the capitalist legal order--the petty bourgeoisie is disposed toward fluctuation, linking up sometimes with the camp of counterreformation and the opponents of bourgeois

reforms, who may conditionally be called "regressive revivalists" (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami), and sometimes with the supporters of radical transformations, the "progressive revivalists" (M. Qadhafi and G.A. Parvez).

The ideological casting around of the petty bourgeoisie often makes complicated the identification of the ideological positions of this party and organization or the other there with one of the two above-mentioned types of "revivalism". If "Maudoodism," the platform of the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the revivalism of G. Parvez may unhesitatingly be attributed respectively to the category of regressive and progressive currents, with respect to the broad, truly mass movement which "Khomeinism" represents in Iran such an unreserved identification is impossible, if only for the fact that regressive ideas of political theocracy are combined therein with progressive ideas of socioeconomic egalitarianism. Fundamental differences between the two types of "revivalism" are revealed upon an analysis of their standpoints with respect to fundamental problems of social development.

On questions connected with the political structure of the "Islamic state" the "regressive revivalists" adhere to positions of theocracy. They are opposed to all legislative practice, declaring that the law may emanate only from Allah and that for this reason the Shari'ah--divine law--is eternal and is not subject to revision. "Islam is a perfect religion," Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi, president of the Jamaat ul-ulema-i Pakistan organization, claims, "giving laws which regulate all activity and for this reason do not sanction what in modern parlance may be termed legislation. Islamic institutions need be interpreted only by those who understand them (that is, the ulema--theologians--M.S.)."⁷

The "regressive revivalists" categorically object to secular legislation and demand total observance of the Shari'ah, insisting, for example, on the preservation of polygamy, the chador and the Islamic practice of divorce, precise observance of Shari'ah criminal law (punishment for theft, adultery, use of alcohol and so forth), on maintaining non-Muslims in the position of unequal citizens (Dhimmi) and so forth. They advocate the caliphate form of rule. The caliph should, they believe, be a ruler for life and with unlimited power. According to the founder and ideologist of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Abul Ala Maudoodi, "Islam does not consider number a criterion of the truth but proceeds from the fact that one man's opinion is capable of being sounder than the unanimous opinion of the whole council (the reference is to the majlis-i shura--a consultative body of a number of theologians--M.S.).... For this reason the caliph has the right to agree both with the majority and with the minority and even resolve questions, acting solely in accordance with his own judgments."⁸

A number of "regressive revivalist" elements is contained in the interpretation of the "Islamic political system" of the ayatollah Khomeini, which has been reflected in his book "Islamic Government". The fundamental principle of the "Islamic state" in the interpretation of the leader of the anti-shah revolution is allegiance to a religious and not secular political system for the latter is the "work of Satan." The "Islamic" state is constitutional in form. But, Khomeini explains, it is constitutional not in the usually understood meaning of this word--not as a parliamentary system. "It is

constitutional rather in the sense that those who are in power are linked by the totality of conditions and principles clearly expressed in the Koran and also in the traditions of the prophet Mohammed." The fundamental difference of the "Islamic state" from all others is that "it is not representative of the people or a king... who make the laws, and the real authority of legislation belongs exclusively to God."⁹

As far as executive power is concerned, according to Khomeini's assertion, inasmuch as the Almighty has not entrusted to a single actual person the duty of forming an Islamic government in the absence of the hidden imam, this means perpetuating the will of Allah by the virtues which characterized Islamic governments at the dawn of the emergence of Islam, right up to the reign of the 12th imam. Such virtues are inherent in theologians, who have knowledge of divine laws and are for this reason capable, having joined together, of creating an authority which ensures the triumph of universal justice. In addition, Khomeini allows that all the highest virtues could be concentrated in one man (theology), and then the people are obliged to render him unquestioning obedience.

In fact the above-listed propositions of Khomeini's political conception were embodied in the 1979 Iranian Constitution. Thus, according to article 5 of the constitution, "during the absence of the hidden imam the administration of affairs and the leadership of the Muslim community in the Islamic Republic of Iran reside with the fakih who is just, pious, educated... and bold, who has the ability to lead and whom the majority of the people recognizes and accepts as its leader. In the event of no fakih possessing the clear support of a majority of the people, a Leader or Steering Council consisting of fakihs possessing the above-mentioned qualities will assume the functions of leadership."

The paradox of the Iranian revolution, in the course of which (at the current state) the authority of religious law has been restored and the power of the clergy established, is explained by a most intricate interweave of diverse factors. Of considerable significance among them are the disillusionment with the bourgeois democratic institutions and the illusions of the religious masses concerning the possibility of the restoration of justice on the basis of allegiance to divine law and the transfer of power to the "disinterested servants of God" in the person of the theologians. For many people in Iran, evidently, the most important point in Khomeini's declaration was his assurance that under the conditions of Islamic government all citizens are under the protection of the law and that no one has the right to encroach on their security, burst into their homes, arrest them, imprison them, exile them or execute them based merely on simple accusation or suspicion.

The "progressive revivalists" also formally advocate the restoration of "natural" law, which the law of religion allegedly is. Thus judging by his "Green Book," M. Qadhafi proceeds from the premise of the existence of an eternal universal law. "The true law of any society," he says, "is either tradition or religion.... The constitution is not the law of society. The constitution is man-made law." And further: "Religion embraces traditions, which are the expression of the natural life of the peoples. Thus religion is the assertion of natural law. Nonreligious, nontraditional laws are

created by man alone to use them against the other. Thus they are invalid since they are not based on the natural source of tradition and religion."¹⁰

The entire fervor of the political part of M. Qadhafi's "third world theory" is directed against bourgeois democratic institutions. Among these are primarily the parliament, "under the protection of which," according to the Libyan leader, "the most tyrannical dictatorships are concealed."¹¹ The parliamentary system is declared a "fraud" and false substitute for true popular representation for "the poor people are incapable of competing with the wealthy in the election campaign, and for this reason it is only the wealthy who always win."¹²

The party system is viewed as "modern dictatorship". The party, M. Qadhafi believes, is not a truly democratic institution inasmuch as it represents the interests not of the people as a whole but of individual groups of people with common interests. The party system contributes to the alienation of society. Interparty struggle, "although creating political activeness, is politically, socially and economically ruinous for society."¹³

The author of the "third world theory" declares as a "fraud against democracy" plebiscites, claiming that "neither those who say 'yes' nor those who say 'no' in fact express their will";¹⁴ they are deprived of the opportunity of explaining the reasons for their approval or rejection. M. Qadhafi calls for an end to sham democracy and the establishment of so-called "direct" or "people's" democracy--the creation of people's assemblies and committees declared "the end product of the popular struggle for democracy."¹⁵ The following political structure is proposed. The entire people is split into local people's assemblies electing steering committees, which in sum constitute regional people's conferences. The local people's assemblies elect people's administrative committees--accountable executive bodies. Besides the fact that they are members of the local people's assemblies, all citizens are members of the corresponding trade unions and public organizations. The steering committees of the people's assemblies, trade unions and public organizations convene annually at a general people's congress, which tackles the main state problems and formulates the country's policy.

It is obvious from what has been said above that the "third world theory" criticizes many actual flaws of the bourgeois democratic system. The proposed political structure is allegedly modeled, as Libyan leaders have pointed out repeatedly, on the Muslim "councils" (ash-shura). It is not difficult to note, however, that the "power of the people" system envisages the electivity of all organs of power and administration according to a kind of territorial-production principle. Although the "Green Book" itself says nothing about this, it would appear beyond a doubt that the "third world theory" political concept has felt a certain influence of some principles of socialist democracy.

The experiment of the Libyan Jamahiriyah merits attention as an attempt to create a democratic model distinct from the bourgeois model and providing for the enlistment of the broad masses of working people in management and administration. At the same time this experiment has certain weak aspects which have to be

reflected in this way or the other in the functioning of this model. The "third world theory" political concept ignores the class division of society which actually exists. A declarative denial of classes cannot put an end to them since the basis of class differentiation is the objectively different attitude toward the means of production. The "third world theory" proceeds from the idealistic premise of the existence of an eternal universal law and on this basis rejects legislative practice as such. It can be understood that the hypocrisy of the "democracy" of an antagonistic society and the one-sidedness of laws designed to protect primarily the interests of the ruling classes are capable of engendering a nihilistic attitude toward any democratic system and at the same time nurturing illusions concerning the possibility of finding an "eternal" law embodied in religion. At the same time it has to be seen that this nihilism and these illusions conceal a danger of lawlessness, tyranny and theocratic diktat.

A fundamental difference is also revealed upon a comparison of the positions of the "revivalists" of both types on the problems of the Muslim countries' socioeconomic development. The "regressives" defend private property, insist particularly on the preservation of private land tenure, object to any types of nationalization and so forth. The "progressives" are supporters of a limitation of private property and an expansion of the state sector and urge the implementation of socioeconomic programs aimed at reducing property differences.

Practical actions for realization of an "Islamic" economic model are already being undertaken in certain oriental countries. Thus in February 1979, at the time of celebration of the prophet Mohammed's birthday, President Zia ul-Haq announced the introduction in Pakistan of the *nizam-i-islam* (Islamic system), which provides for the restoration of Shari'ah courts and religious legislation and the introduction of Islamic principles in the economy (obligatory payment of the zakat and 'ushr taxes and the banning of *riba*). A superficial view of the economic "innovations" in Pakistan might give the impression that these measures are aimed against the concentration of material wealth and pursue the goal of the citizens' property equalization.

The introduction of "Muslim" taxes will lead to an increase in tax liability of at least 30 percent. Not providing for progressive liability, they will be less burdensome for big than small-scale capital, the artisans and the peasants. Furthermore, the introduction of the said taxes puts the Sunnis in a more advantageous position compared with the representatives of other religious communities, which already pay taxes for the benefit of the poor (the *khums* of Shi'ites, for example, who constitute 10-15 percent of the population).¹⁶

The new tax system is fraught with negative consequences for Pakistan's economy for, given the existence of the present regime, it may be expected that the monetary resources mobilized by the state will be channeled not into an improvement in the living standard of the poor but the strengthening of the army, defrayal of militarist expenditure and the expansion and strengthening of the machinery of the military, policy and officials. In addition, the zakat and 'ushr law will be reflected in business activity and could entail a certain drain of national capital from the country. The benefits for the broad people's

masses from implementation of the riba law are even more dubious. According to Zia ul-Haq's statement, it is proposed introducing an economic system prohibiting usurious interest gradually, over the course of 3 years.

It is today still too early to make a conclusive evaluation of the measures aimed at the "Islamization" of the economy in Pakistan. However, it can be said even now that the introduction of zakat and 'ushr and the prohibition of riba are being extensively used for propaganda purposes and for enlisting the religious masses on its side. They perceive the said measures as the desire of the military administration to prevent inordinate accumulations of wealth and contribute to the removal of property inequality. Such measures really could infringe the interests of individual propertied strata, but it should be borne in mind here that these measures constitute part of the government's general policy of the development of a "mixed economy" aimed at the preferential development of the private sector. It is indicative that under the military regime a decision was adopted on the legal possibility of the transfer to the private sector of all enterprises of the base sectors of industry taken under state control at the time of the Z.A. Bhutto government and those which were earlier in the exclusive charge of the state (metallurgy, heavy engineering, chemical, cement and petrochemical industry and others). Guarantees against future nationalization were announced even.

Although many of its supporters believe that it will lead to a deviation from the capitalist path of development, the "Islamization" of the economy does not mean essentially a renunciation of the capitalist system of management but represents an attempt to realize an "improved" version of capitalism. While not sparing the oppression of exploitation, the "Islamic system" could at the same time have a braking impact on capitalist development, thereby making this process even more agonizing.

The "Islamic" or Toudi economy concept, which is being propagandized in present-day Iran, is also being put forward as an alternative to capitalism. The appellation Toudi is meant to signify, the authors of this concept believe, that the proposed system is an "economy of divine harmony" in which not only its constituent elements are balanced but there is also a harmonious unity of economic aspects with the religious principles determining the "Islamic way of life" as a whole.

Iran's constitution (article 44) declares that the "economic system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on three sectors--state, cooperative and private." Ascribed to the category of state ownership are large-scale extractive and processing industry and the production of producer goods, foreign trade, the banks, power stations, water supply, transportation and communications media, that is, all the key sectors of the economy; cooperative ownership is the ownership of associations and production and distribution societies in the cities and villages. As far as private ownership is concerned, this includes everything that has not been encompassed by the first two forms of ownership.

The constitution says that a more precise definition of the said forms of ownership will be given later, on the basis of a special law. It is planned

to effect "balance and justice" in the Islamic economic system with the aid of a tax system based on "Koranic principles," that is, by way of the introduction of zakat, 'ushr and so forth. The essence of the "Touidi economy," as understood by its ideologists, is realization of the principle: "production according to capability and consumption according to piety." The latter is meant to signify contentment with little in accordance with the ideal of self-limitation which was preached by the imam Ali, who is revered by the Shi'ites.

The Iranian version of the "Islamic economy" is manifestly different from the Pakistani version, despite the fact that in both cases it is a question of the restoration of Muslim principles allegedly preventing an inordinate concentration of wealth. In the first case the emphasis is put on the preferential development of the state and cooperative sectors,¹⁷ in the second on the development of private enterprise. The Iranian version has clearly expressed antimonopoly and state capitalist features reflecting the political course aimed at the defense of small-scale-ownership interests. In both cases it is a question of the implementation of a kind of experiment with "Islamic adjustments" to the bourgeois path of development.

In the search for methods of the most effective surmounting of age-old backwardness and the strengthening of national independence ideologists in Muslim countries are attempting in certain cases to construct an "Islamic" version of socialist development. Among such concepts is "new socialism"--the economic aspect of M. Qadhafi's "third world theory".

Formally the Libyan leader's socialist concept is not called Islamic. In the second part of the "Green Book," where its propositions are expounded, the word "Islam" is not mentioned once. This is understandable inasmuch as "new socialism" is part of a theory pretending to universal significance and the solution of problems not only of Muslim peoples but of mankind as a whole. Nor does M. Qadhafi's conception provide for the introduction in the economy of an Islamic tax system, the prohibition of riba and so forth typical of the customary "Muslim socialism" theories.

Nonetheless, it has to be noted that M. Qadhafi chose for this book the color green--the symbol of Islam--and that, as mentioned earlier, he asserts as the sole law of society religious law. The explanatory notes in the "Green Book" are packed with quotes from the Koran, the hadith and other religious sources. This enables us to conclude that it is precisely the Muslim world which is primarily the environment within whose framework the "third world theory" could recruit supporters.

The Leitmotiv of M. Qadhafi's "new socialism" is the "Partners and Not Mercenaries" slogan. The Libyan leader believes that all the woes of the modern world ensue from the fact that the basis of the economic organization of society is the wage system of producers turned into slaves. M. Qadhafi urges realization of the principle: "He who produces, consumes."¹⁸ The author of the "third world theory" sees the solution of man's economic problems in "abrogation of the wage system and man's liberation from the burden thereof and a return to natural law, which determine people's mutual relations prior to the formation of classes and governments and laws created by people."¹⁹

M. Qadhafi considers the equality of the three components of production, in which category he puts raw material, the means of production and the producers, the essence of "natural law". Derived profit should be shared in three equal parts among the three above components participating in production.²⁰

The "new socialism" theory envisages the coexistence of private and public property. It permits private ownership in an amount not exceeding a man's personal requirements and not making use of another's labor.²¹ As far as public ownership is concerned, the producers are "partners" in its production and distribution. M. Qadhafi's theory condemns exploitation, enrichment at the expense of others, hoarding and so forth. Private ownership of land is not recognized. "Land is not someone's property, but everyone has the right to use it, working on it."²² Measures of a socialist orientation are being implemented in Libya in embodiment of the "new socialism" theory: a considerable proportion of large-scale property is being expropriated, the activity of private enterprises is being restricted, cooperatives are being created, attempts are being made to implement self-management at enterprises and so forth.²³

At the same time, however, M. Qadhafi's "new socialism" is distinguished by the contradictoriness and utopian character typical of such petty bourgeois concepts. The declarative assertion of the preservation of private property within limits satisfying personal requirements is extremely vague for it is not clear who determines the scale of these requirements and how. Promotion of the "partnership" principle as a panacea for all socioeconomic problems testifies to a failure to understand the futility of the solution of modern social problems by way of the denial of objective realities and attempts to "restore" a preclass society.

Summing up, it may be concluded that "revivalism" represents ideological currents mainly in a petty bourgeois environment, reflecting the class duality and contradictoriness of these strata of the population. The strengthening of "revivalist" currents in the social thought of Muslim countries observed in recent years does not mean the "failure" and "winding down" of the reform process in Islam, as Western bourgeois orientalist and certain Soviet scholars claim. Such a "pessimistic" evaluation of the prospects of Islamic reformation ensue from an erroneous reduction of "revivalism" to its counterreformist "regressive" version; and a disregard for the fact that the main manifestation of the "progressive" concepts of "revivalism" testifies to the expansion and deepening of the reformation process in Mohammedanism, into which, in addition to the bourgeoisie, broad strata of the population are gradually being drawn, which will inevitably entail the democratization and radicalization of the reformation.

A differentiated approach to the "revivalist" currents is of great political significance inasmuch as it makes it possible to determine the true content of the religious slogans, thereby affording an opportunity for ascertaining on the one hand the true reactionaries and, on the other, those who could potentially become an ally of the forces advocating social progress.

Such an approach is all the more necessary in that "revivalism" is not exclusively a Muslim phenomenon. Similar trends of both the "progressive

revivalist" and "regressive revivalist" type are occurring in countries where other oriental religions are predominant, which is explained by the existence of a number of common regularities of their social development. And although currently these trends beyond the confines of the Muslim world are not the dominant ones, they should not be ignored, ruling out entirely the possibility of a "religious renaissance" in the sphere where other oriental dogmas are prevalent.

FOOTNOTES

1. It is this, probably, which could explain the conclusion drawn by Hegel in his lectures on historical philosophy which sounds so odd in the present situation: "Islam long since quit the world historical arena and returned again to oriental tranquillity and immobility" (Hegel, "Philosophy of History," "Works," vol 8, Moscow, 1935, p 339).
2. R. Ul'yanovskiy, "The Iranian Revolution and its Particular Features," KOMMUNIST No 10, 1982, p 106.
3. K.N. Brutents, "The National Liberation Movement and the Ideological Struggle in the Asian and African Developing Countries" in "The Struggle of Ideas in the Modern World," vol 3, Moscow, 1978, p 23.
4. Quoted from A.A. Maudoodi, "Towards Understanding Islam," New Delhi, 1961, p 89.
5. M. Iqbal, "The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam," Lahore, 1962, p 54.
6. "The Encyclopedia of Philosophy," vol 1, New York-London, 1972, p 99.
7. Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act II of 1954 To Inquire Into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Lahore, 1954, p 102.
8. A.A. Maudoodi, "Political Theory of Islam," Rampur (s.a.), pp 57-58.
9. Quoted from THE GAZETTE, Montreal, 12 January 1980.
10. M Qadhafi, "The Green Book," vol I, Tripoli (s.a.), pp 68-69, 76-77.
11. Ibid., p 22.
12. Ibid., p 20.
13. Ibid., p 29.
14. Ibid., p 49.
15. Ibid., p 56.
16. See I.V. Shmuyda, "Pakistan: Islamic Principles in the Economy" in AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No 4, 1980.

17. For more detail see R. Ul'yanovskiy, Op. cit., pp 113-116.
18. M. Qadhafi, Op. cit., vol II, p 14.
19. Ibid., pp 20-21.
20. Ibid., p 35.
21. Ibid., p 76.
22. Ibid., p 47.
23. For more detail see L.B. Borisov, "Particular Features of the Socioeconomic Development of Present-Day Libya" in NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 3, 1982.

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WORLD CONFERENCE OF MONGOLIA SPECIALISTS HELD IN ULAANBAATAR

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 145-151

[M.I. Gol'man report on Fourth International Congress of Mongolian Scholars]

[Excerpts] International congresses of Mongolian scholars (ICMS) are representative forums of scholars from various countries--historians and economists, linguists and philologists, philosophers and lawyers, sociologists and art critics, ethnographers and anthropologists and so forth--united by respect for and a scientific interest in the material, cultural and spiritual values created by the Mongolian people throughout their long history and their achievements in socialist building. The preparation and convening--once every 5-6 years--of international congresses of Mongolian scholars for the purpose of mutual familiarization and collation of the results of the development of world Mongolian studies, an exchange of opinions on pertinent problems of the science of Mongolian studies and its further progress and the strengthening of creative ties and contacts is undertaken by the ICMS Standing Committee, which was elected at the Second ICMS in 1970. The ICMS Standing Committee relies in its coordinating, publishing and organizational activity on the help and support of the MPRP Central Committee and the MPR Government, the participation of the MPR Academy of Sciences and the assistance of UNESCO.

The choice of Ulaanbaatar as the venue of ICMS and the location of the ICMS Standing Committee is in itself testimony to the recognition of the MPR by the broad international scientific community as the main center of world Mongolian studies.

The leading role of the MPR in the development of Mongolistics and the increased authority of Mongolian social science were confirmed anew by the Fourth ICMS in August 1982.

The congress was opened by Ch. Peren, head of the Mongolian delegation and president of the MPR Academy of Sciences. He welcomed the delegations of Great Britain, Hungary, the GDR, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, India, Italy, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Cuba, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the USSR, United States, Turkey, Finland, France, the FRG, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Japan and also official representatives: Dr M. Singh (India) of UNESCO, Prof D. (Sinor) (United States) of the Permanent International Conference of Altay Scholars and

S.I. Potabenko (USSR) of the International Association for the Study of Central Asia. Approximately 200 delegates to and guests of the congress represented all the main Mongolian study centers of 23 countries of Europe, Asia and America. Mongolian scholars from Austria and certain other countries sent the congress telegrams and letters wishing it success.

The strongest and most representative delegation was that of the MPR (18 delegates)--5 full members and 8 corresponding members of the MPR Academy of Sciences and 5 doctors of sciences. Soviet Mongolian studies were represented by a delegation (16 persons) headed by V.M. Solntsev, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies. The delegations of the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Japan and the United States were quite large. A message of greetings to the delegates to and guests of the congress was sent by Yu. Tsedenbal, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee, chairman of the MPR Great People's Hural Presidium and honorary member of the MPR Academy of Sciences. It observed: "The good tradition of meeting regularly in our country to exchange opinions on the results of scientific research performed in the sphere of Mongolian studies which has come about among the world's Mongolian scholars is of great significance in the study by joint efforts of the history, language, economy and culture of the Mongolian people and the fundamental socioeconomic transformations and the cultural revolution which have occurred in Mongolia in the years of people's power. A valuable contribution to this noble cause is being made together with Mongolian scholars by their colleagues from different parts of the world."* Their achievements in the development of Mongolian studies since the Third ICMS (1976) were described in the first plenary session in the paper of Sh. Natsagdorzh, chairman of the congress' organizing committee and vice president of the MPR Academy of Sciences, "Topical Problems of Mongolian Studies". He paid particular attention to the research of Mongolian scholars. Thus in recent years the MPR's social scientists have achieved significant results, particularly in the study of the common regularities and national singularities of noncapitalist development and the building of socialism in Mongolia, in determination of the main trends of the country's socioeconomic and sociopolitical evolution at the current stage and so forth. Mongolian scholars have published a number of major works of a summary nature, a number of works of great scientific-theoretical significance has been published in conjunction with Soviet specialists, a master outline of the development and location of the MPR's production forces through 1990 has been drawn up and so forth.**

* UNEN 25 August 1982.

** "BNMAY-yn soyelyn tuukh" ("History of MPR Culture"), Bot' 1, Ulaanbaatar, 1981; "BNMAY-d sotsialist azh terekh yes tolovshin khegzhizh bayгаа asuudal" (Problems of the Formation and Development of the Socialist Way of Live in the MPR), Ulaanbaatar, 1981; "BNMAY sotsialist edlyn засгийн integratsiyn sistend. Praktik onolyn asuudluud" ("The MPR in the System of Socialist Economic Integration. Problems of Theory and Practice"), Ulaanbaatar, 1981; "The MPR's Noncapitalist Path of Development and the Working Class," Ulaanbaatar, 1971; "History of Soviet-Mongolian Relations," Moscow, 1971; "USSR-MPR. Cooperation and Rapprochement (on the 60th Anniversary of the Mongolian People's Revolution)," Moscow, Ulaanbaatar, 1971; "The Role of the CPSU and the MPRP in the Development and Extension of Soviet-Mongolian Cooperation," Moscow, Ulaanbaatar, 1971.

All this--together with the extensive publication of historical, literary and legal monuments, intensive research into the prerevolutionary history and rich cultural heritage of the Mongolian people and their language and literature and also the successful development of the history of the culture of the Central Asian peoples, general questions of nomadism, comparative linguistics and topical problems of the developing countries and the socialist orientation--constitutes the basic directions of the development of social science in the MPR.

Sh. Natsagdorzh appraised highly the state of Mongolian studies in the USSR. "Relying on progressive methodology, possessing highly skilled area-study scholars and with traditional long-standing ties to Mongolia and Mongolian science, Soviet Mongolian studies," he emphasized, "occupy an outstanding place in modern world Mongolistics."*

Having noted the specific features of national schools of Mongolian studies which have taken shape or are taking shape in the socialist countries, Sh. Natsagdorzh concluded that in terms of the number of scientific centers and specialist personnel and the historical studies and historiographical resources, as also in terms of the scale and results of the studies, these countries occupy the leading positions in the development of Mongolistics.

Despite periodic recessions and upturns, Mongolian studies in capitalist countries, in the characterization of Sh. Natsagdorzh and other Mongolian scholars, are currently experiencing a "period of renewal," particularly in the United States, the FRG, Japan, Great Britain and France.** Specialized scientific research centers are operating in these countries under the auspices of a number of universities, the scientific and scientific-educational "Mongolian societies" are stepping up their activity, special journals and information bulletins are published, cooperation and the coordination of research work at the national and international levels are increasing and the broad-scale--serial, as a rule--publication of valuable sources (United States, the FRG, Denmark), textological, source-study and historiographical research and so forth is being undertaken. All this testifies to the high degree of linguistic and professional training of many Western Mongolian scholars. Another characteristic feature of Mongolian studies in the West, particularly in the United States and France and partly of the FRG and Austria, is the expansion of the contemporary set of problems of research. The development of new directions of bourgeois Mongolian studies is proceeding, as before, in contradictory fashion and in the acute confrontation of progressive scientific and tendentious, falsifying and propaganda currents. Among the developing countries Sh. Natsagdorzh mentioned India, where Mongolian studies, relying on most ancient cultural relations with Mongolia, is developing as an independent scientific discipline.

In conclusion Sh. Natsagdorzh called on the world's Mongolian scholars to pay

* NOVOSTI MONGOLII 27 August 1982.

** MONGOLIYA No 8, p 26; NOVOSTI MONGOLII 24 August 1982.

particular attention to the study of the most recent period in Mongolia's history and noted the readiness of Mongolian scientists to render their foreign colleagues assistance in this matter.

The congress worked in three sections, at which 163 papers were read and discussed. In addition, 35 papers were submitted for publication in the works of the congress.* The bulk of the papers was delivered by MPR scholars. Soviet scholars submitted 31 papers. The papers of the scholars of the socialist countries were distinguished by relevance and the breadth of their generalizations. The papers of Ts. Puntsagchnorov (MPR), "The Political Conception of Prof Rupen's New Book," B.P. Gurevich (USSR), "The Nature of the Political Status of the (Dzhungar) Khanate and its Interpretation in the Historiography of the PRC," (Estril'i) Rey (Cuba), "Certain Historical Aspects of Sino-Mongolian Relations," L. Holoupkova (Czechoslovakia), "The National Language Issue in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region," and the speeches of (Vu-Kh'yu) (Vietnam) and (Suvantkhon Bufanovong) (Lao People's Democratic Republic) and others are, in particular, of definite interest.

The majority of the 56 papers in the "History of Economics" section (chaired by Academician Sh. Natsagdorzh) was devoted to present-day problems. The paper of S. Norovsambuu, director of the MPR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law and corresponding member of the MPR Academy of Sciences, "Certain Most Important Aspects of the MPR's Noncapitalist Development," determined the general significance of the basic features of Mongolia's revolutionary experience. The papers of M. Luvsandorzh (MPR)--on the economic problems of the transition to socialism, bypassing capitalism in the MPR's experience--D.B. Ulymzhiyev (USSR)--on the history and special features of the formation of peasant cooperatives in Mongolia--and (G. Kholay) (Poland)--on its international significance--were devoted to the theory and practice of noncapitalist development.

Scholars of the socialist countries also brought to light such general methodological topics as the basic stages of the development of Mongolian-Soviet relations (M. Sandzdorzh, MPR), the economic relations of socialism in the MPR (S.K. Roshchin, USSR), the characteristic features of the present-day Mongolian working class (B. Chinchuluun, B. Enkhbayar, MPR) and its place in social production (G.S. Yaskina, USSR), changes in the social composition of the herdsmen class (L. Bam-Ochir, MPR), the role and functions of the Mongolian state in the period of the building of the socialist society (K. Borman, GDR) and the formation and development of contemporary man in the MPR (D. Dashzhamu, MPR). The MPR's increasing assertiveness in the solution of topical questions of international relations was dealt with in the papers of the Mongolian scholars Sh. Sandak, M. Pagma and S. Ishdorzh. Devoting his speech to the topic of the MPR's struggle for peace and security in Asia, E. Laboor (GDR) emphasized the great significance of the MPR's initiative concerning the conclusion of a convention on mutual nonaggression and the nonuse of force in relations between Asian and Pacific states. The papers of the Mongolian economists T. Namzhim, Ya. Tsegmid, D. Tumurtogoo and others illustrated ways of an improvement in the structure of the economy and industrialization of the MPR, changes in the methods of management and organization of labor in animal

* "General Protocol of the Fourth ICMS," Ulaanbaatar, 1982, p 6.

husbandry, questions of the development of farming, nature conservation and the rational use of the MPR's natural resources and so forth. The subject of the paper of T.V. Yakimova (USSR) and S. Myagmarkhav (MPR) was a typology of nomadic and seminomadic animal husbandry in Asian countries and its prospects.

Certain present-day aspects were broached by Mongolian scholars of capitalist countries: L. Gabrielle (Switzerland), M. Onuki (Japan) and (Karen) Rowling (Canada). In his paper, "Relationship Between the Center and the Periphery. Comparative Analysis of the Development of the Countries of Inner Asia," the latter pursued the idea of similarity and emphasized the significance of common features in modernization models, particularly the urbanization of formerly backward countries of the Central Asia region. As noted in the debate, such a formulation of the question could be fruitful only given consideration of the differences in the political and socioeconomic systems of the states in question, which was not the case in the paper, unfortunately. The paper of J. Kruger (United States), "Baron Ungern von Sternberg in Mongolia," was of a historiographical nature. It was noted during discussion thereof that Marxist historiography has provided an objective evaluation of the "mad baron" and his adventures in Mongolia and that for this reason the continued interest in the United States in this odious figure is of a clearly unhealthy nature.

The final plenary session received and approved the reports of the section chairmen, adopted a message to Yu. Tsedenbal and the summary documents of the congress--the "Declaration" and general protocol--and made partial changes to the ICMS Standing Committee. The scientific significance of the congress was appraised highly at the session by V.M. Solntsev, M. Singh, D. (Sinor), Academician W. Markewicz (Poland), P. Fritze, T. Tekin, (Vu-Khueu), Sh. Odzava and S.I. Potabenko.

The closing remarks were delivered by Ch. Tseren, president of the MPR Academy of Sciences and the ICMS Standing Committee.

The Fourth ICMS was conducted on a high scientific level and in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and creative assertiveness. The varied cultural program enabled the delegates and guests to familiarize themselves with the achievements of the Mongolian people. The results of the Fourth International Congress confirmed anew the fruitfulness of and need for this form of international cooperation of scholars, and its material and works will serve the further progress of Mongolian studies.

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INSTITUTE-UN CONFERENCE ON STATE SECTOR IN AFRICAN ECONOMIES HELD

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 83 pp 151-154

[S.V. Sergeyev report: "'Role of the State Sector in the Social and Economic Development of African Countries'"]

[Text] Organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa and the UN Institute of Training and Research in cooperation with the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, the seminar was held from 13 through 25 September 1982 in Moscow and Alma-Ata. The seminar was led by Prof G.V. Smirnov (USSR) and K. Ntambi, counselor for economics in the Uganda Permanent Representation at the United Nations. Scientists and practical workers from almost 20 African countries, the Soviet Union and Hungary and also graduate students and trainees studying in Moscow VUZ's took part in the seminar. The seminar was a component of the realization of an international project along UN lines providing for the preparation of a collective monograph on the subject of the same name.

Welcoming the participants in the seminar, An.A. Gromyko, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, emphasized that the work of the seminar corresponds to the task of fulfillment of a number of UN resolutions which draw attention to the need for systematic research into the role of the state in the accomplishment of the complex tasks put forward by the heads of state and government of the OAU at the second special session of their assembly in Lagos (1980). Among the problems whose solution is possible given the active participation of the state sector An.A. Gromyko named limitation of the influence of foreign companies (primarily transnational corporations); providing the population with basic food products and necessities; diversification of production; development of natural resources; increased employment; and the development of backward and the assimilation of new areas. The creation of state enterprises will contribute to the development of the base sectors of industry and acceleration of the process of industrialization, the retooling of individual sectors, a saving of foreign currency by way of substituting one's own production for imports, increased income, an expansion and strengthening of the material base of social services and so forth.

The participants in the seminar put the main emphasis in the papers and the discussion on such questions as the regularities of the inception and

development of the state sector on the African continent, its organizational structure, the possibilities of the use in the developing countries of the historical experience of the Soviet Union and the role of the state in realization of the socioeconomic strategy of African countries and also in the developing world's struggle for the reorganization of international economic relations on an equal and just basis.

In the opinion of G.V. Smirnov, the state sector should incorporate facilities of the social infrastructure since without consideration of the activity of the state in this sphere of the national economy we can neither evaluate the role of the state in socioeconomic development nor fully ascertain the efficiency of the state sector as a whole. It was also noted that the coming into being of the state sector as a new form of management demands serious support, particularly under the conditions of the underdeveloped multistructural economy of countries of the African continent with their multifactor dependence on the world capitalist economy and under the conditions of acute competition on foreign markets. The state as an organ of national control, if it is oriented toward development of the state sector, should create the necessary conditions for its efficient functioning and increased contribution to the accomplishment of the tasks of surmounting economic backwardness. An important role in this respect can and should be performed by measures of economic policy implemented by the state.

S.A. Bessonov (USSR) devoted his paper to problems of planning the state sector of the economy of African countries. He observed that the state sector exercises its functions most fully and efficiently only when it operates as a single organism in the channel of a statewide development strategy. Analyzing the role of the state in African countries' struggle for a new international economic order, N.V. Volkov (USSR) emphasized that the state sector is the sole economic force capable of resisting the economic and political pressure of the imperialist monopolies. The state's assertive activity in the economy and foreign economic relations represents a most important condition of the real progress of the developing countries along the path of realization of their demands concerning the reorganization of international economic relations on an equal, democratic basis. B.B. Runov (USSR) dwelt specially in a paper devoted to the role and tasks of state policy in the development of the national scientific-technical potential of African countries on the social conditionality of scientific-technical progress. Will it be oriented toward progressive socioeconomic development and satisfaction of the needs of the majority of the population or will it serve the narrow selfish interests of the elite strata of society and foreign monopolies--this will ultimately depend on the social nature of the state and its actual policy. The tasks of state scientific-technical policy, in particular, include determination of the social consequences of scientific-technical progress and control over its impact on such acute problems as employment, income distribution and the formation of the national consumption structure, that is, ensuring the coordination of scientific-technical and social progress. This determines the ultimate goals and criteria of scientific-technical policy. It should contribute to the creation of a truly independent economy capable of reproduction on a national basis, the profound structural reorganization of the economy, the maximum use of natural and human resources and, as a result, a fundamental improvement in

the living conditions of the working people's masses. I.L. Fituni (USSR) examined the social aspects of the activity of the state sector in African countries. He observed that the state sector has a special role in an acceleration of the process of class formation, particularly the formation of a national proletariat in the African countries. After all, it is at state enterprises that the highest concentration of a trained proletariat occurs. With the strengthening and growth of the state sector there is also an expansion of the gamut of the results of its functioning.

Soviet scholars' papers on the role of the state budget in the development strategy of the state sector in African countries (Yu.M. Osipov), the organizational principles of the creation of a state sector on the African continent (Yu.V. Gusev), ways and methods of the development of the state sector (I.B. Matsenko), the basic directions of the USSR's assistance to the development of the state sector in the economy of African countries (Ye.S. Dranitsyn) and others were received with interest.

(I. Dobozi) (Hungary) examined financial aspects of the activity of the state sector. The representatives of African states characterized the role of the state sector in the solution of problems of socioeconomic development on the basis of the specific examples of their own countries. M. Benhasin (Algeria) emphasized that only thanks to the efforts of the state was the country able to implement a number of progressive socioeconomic transformations. E. Andriamihata (Madagascar) dwelt on the role of the state in the solution of sociopolitical problems on Madagascar in the transitional democratic period. P. (Aloziye) (Nigeria) studied the legal aspects of regulating the activity of the state when it tackled socioeconomic problems. S. (Dodzhi) (Togo) analyzed on the basis of his own country the state's role in the solution of problems of employment on the continent. S.D. Aruna (Sierra Leone) displayed great interest in questions of the organization of the state sector and administration in the USSR.

The participants in the seminar expressed the unanimous opinion that the state sector in the developing countries is a necessary instrument of the achievement of economic independence. By way of direct participation in economic activity (state enterprises and capital investments) and indirect regulation of the national economy (planning, financial and tax policy, price control and such) the state coordinates the development of structures, sectors and areas. Inasmuch as the state possesses considerable financial and material resources, it is capable of assuming less profitable forms of economic activity important for the economy, surmounting bottlenecks in the sectorial and territorial structure of the economy and, to a certain extent, of subordinating the activity of the private sector to national interests. Thus there is a gradual strengthening of regulating principles in the economy as a counterweight to spontaneous features.

In the papers and in the discussion the participants in the seminar determined the difference between the categories of profitability and economic efficiency in the state sector. On the whole, it and the majority of its enterprises in the material production sphere should be profitable to cater for the accumulation of capital and development as whole. However, the state is not, naturally, guided by the principle of profitability in the spheres of education, culture and health

care. It usually develops the economic and social infrastructure on favorable terms. The state may depart from the principle of profitability at certain enterprises of the state sector in order to stimulate the socially necessary production of basic necessities. At the same time, as the participants in the seminar stressed, the problem of increasing the efficiency of the state sector makes a cautious approach to nationalization essential. It must be prepared and implemented in such a way and within such limits as to ensure that the final net benefits for the country's economic and social development are maximal.

With respect to the question of the organizational structure and system of management of enterprises of the state sector the seminar noted the need to proceed from the fact that all state establishments organize their work, while possessing sufficient independence in deciding questions of current economic activity, on the basis of development plans and programs, that is, the basic provisions of the state's economic policy. Effective state control over the activity of its enterprises must be ensured in this sphere.

The participants in the seminar criticized development strategies based on Western economic theories. It was emphasized that the practical realization of these concepts leads to a deepening of the dependence of the national economy of states of the African continent on the economy of Western countries, orients the developing world's production toward satisfaction of the demand of the highest strata of the population, limits growth in the number of new jobs and stimulates inadequately the enlistment of the traditional sector in the process of transformation of national socioeconomic structures. For this reason, as the papers and the discussion observed, great attention in the development process should be paid to the intrinsic efforts of each country and also to the expansion of the regional cooperation of states of the African continent.

Great significance for the development of the state sector in African countries, the seminar emphasized, is attached to the use of the historical experience of the USSR and the other socialist countries. In this connection there was detailed discussion of such questions as the use in the process of the creation and development of the state sector in the Soviet Union of the objective laws of socialist building, the state's material support for cooperative forms of the economy, imposition of a foreign trade monopoly, planning, the state's cooperation with the private sectors and others. It was also emphasized that the developing world's cooperation with the socialist countries contributes to the increased role of the state sector in realization of the achievements of scientific-technical progress and the goals of socioeconomic development.

As noted at the seminar, limitation of the arms race could serve to release additional resources for development (on both the international and regional levels). In this case the state sector of African countries would increase its potential appreciably in the solution of the most important socioeconomic problems confronting the African states.

Familiarization with a number of industrial and agricultural enterprises of Kazakhstan enabled the African participants in the seminar to see for themselves the historic achievements of the Kazakh people, which in the single family of Soviet republics, have achieved the true burgeoning of all aspects of economic and social life.

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BOOK ALLEGES TURKISH CAPITALISM PRESENTS 'DANGER OF FASCISM'

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 83 pp 184-188

[S.M. Ivanov review of book on economic history of Turkish Republic]

[Text] The monograph in question* is a multilevel study of the Turkish Republic's socioeconomic development in the half-century plus of its existence. According to the author, this country's economic history in most recent times "is the history of the development of capitalism and its growth into state-monopoly capitalism [SMC] as an alternative to a revolutionary solution of the most acute socioeconomic contradictions confronting Turkish society" (p 13).

Yu.N. Rozaliyev's formulation of the problem of SMC in Turkey is very timely. The studies of Soviet authors devoted to the elaboration of a typology of Afro-Asian states have ascertained a significant group of states in which national capitalism has become the determining structure of social evolution. In certain countries which have proceeded furthest along this path the development of SMC trends has become pronounced. It may be assumed that in the event of the further capitalist evolution of this group of states, the said trends in them will strengthen and that this will in time lead to the formation in certain regions of the Asian world of an oriental version of SMC. It is also natural to assume that such a reorganization of the economic system will introduce serious changes not only to the economic but also the sociopolitical and international life of the continent. Whence the need to forecast these changes, determine their essence and ascertain the specific features of SMC in Asia.

With reference to Turkey the monograph in question examines many of these questions for the first time. Tracing the path of Turkey's socioeconomic development from the first years of the republic's existence through the end of the 1970's, the author concludes that "in the last 5-10 years a national SMC has taken shape conclusively" (p 271) in this country.

* Yu.N. Rozaliyev, "Ekonomicheskaya istoriya Turetskoy Respubliki" [Economic History of the Turkish Republic], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izd-va "Nauka," 1980, 304 pp.

Determination of the nature and specific features of the growth of Turkish capitalism into SMC occupies the central place in Yu.N. Rozaliyev's study. "The process of the expansion and strengthening of the positions of big capital and its growth into monopoly capital, the merger with bank capital and the formation of the foundations of national finance capital," the author writes, "was (in Turkey--S.I.) of an extremely complex, contradictory and spasmodic nature. The positions of Turkish finance capital strengthened with the aid and given the direct participation of the state and the support of foreign monopolies under the conditions of the country's continued general economic backwardness, which inevitably engendered a number of particularly complex and acute contradictions in Turkish society" (p 217).

The author discerns the particular features of the maturation of SMC in Turkey in the fact that "this capitalism is not the result of regular passage through all stages of the development of 'normal' SMC, from its lowest forms to the more accomplished and advanced forms. This capitalism appeared in a very short time in an economically backward country under conditions which were exceptionally favorable for business and with the aid of imperialism. Its formation proceeded, as it were, 'from above,' given the predominant role of the state, which continues to perform an important role in this process" (p 217).

As Yu.N. Rozaliyev believes, Turkey's political life in the last two decades has largely been determined by the fact that "the 1960 coup d'etat, which was accomplished by reliance on the petty bourgeoisie, permitted a considerable strengthening of other representatives of monopoly capital which earlier had only been weakly connected with the machinery of state and forced them to regroup their forces and switch to the establishment of control over the state customary for bourgeois countries" (p 285). The logical continuation of this thought of the author's is his forecast of the political development of the country, where in the immediate future "the possibility of the establishment of both a typical two-party administration and an extreme-right dictatorship of the monopoly bourgeoisie relying on petty bourgeois circles cannot be ruled out." "The threat of fascism in Turkey," Yu.N. Rozaliyev believes, "is perfectly real" (p 272).

Such are the basic propositions of the concept of SMC in Turkey advanced by Yu.N. Rozaliyev. They merit serious attention and stimulate discussion of this problem both in the general theoretical and specific-area study spheres.

It would seem to us, for example, that Yu.N. Rozaliyev is right when he notes the extremely complex and spasmodic nature of the development of capitalist forms in Turkey. The specific features of the process in question in this country, as, equally, in other regions of the Afro-Asian world, have been brought about by the fact that the inception of capitalism in them is taking place under the conditions of the active expansion of SMC from the imperialist centers, a result of which is the transfer of mature and passe forms of capitalist relationships to the soil of young, developing capitalism. Capitalism in the Asian and African countries is now characterized to a greater extent than ever by a mixture of different structural forms of the organization of capitalist production and the dramatic nature of the mutual relations of the highest and lowest capitalist structures ensuing thence.

We also have to agree with the author's opinion when he notes the tremendous role which the bourgeois state in Turkey performed and continues to perform in the implantation of capitalist relationships "from above". Capitalism in Turkey is developing with, as its pivot, the stable historical tradition of the state's regulation of society's economic life. State capitalism or statism accommodated itself to Turkish soil so easily that the roots of this policy go back not only to the Turkey of the Young Turks (about which Yu.N. Rozaliyev writes) but also to the deeper historical seams of the Ottoman past.

As a whole, Yu.N. Rozaliyev's work persuades the reader that both the industrial and banking monopolies were conceived and strengthened in Turkey since the war. On the basis of numerous examples the author pursues the thought concerning the growing together of big industrial and banking capital with state capital and their close interweaving, which truly creates the basis for the conception of a SMC trend in the development of Turkish capitalism. But does this mean that Turkish monopoly capitalism, as the author styles it, "conclusively grew into SMC" 5-10 years ago?

We agree with Yu.N. Rozaliyev that there is no alternative to SMC on the path of capitalist evolution. What seems debatable to us is merely the author's evaluation of the degree of maturity of the process in question. Reflection is prompted here if only by the fact that, according to the now generally accepted viewpoint of Academician Ye.S. Varga, which he formulated back at the start of the 1960's, monopoly capitalism conclusively grew into SMC in the Western countries only on the eve and at the outset of the 1960's.* In Turkey, however, according to Yu.N. Rozaliyev, SMC had taken shape at the start of or in the mid-1970's, that is, only 10-15 years later than in the highly developed imperialist countries. True, the author notes repeatedly in his work the specific features of Turkish SMC. Thus he believes that "this capitalism has appeared in a country which is, as before, economically backward and practically agricultural and multistructural, where the lowest forms of capitalism are numerically absolutely predominant in industry and, even more, in agriculture" (p 217).

But do not the specific features of SMC in Turkey formulated by the author cancel out the very content of this category as highly developed, dying capitalism?

While not doubting the fact of the existence of monopoly capital in Turkey, bearing in mind the numerous examples of the growing together of the interests of the machinery of state and the interests of the big industrialists and financiers of the country, we nonetheless do not consider it possible to characterize the socioeconomic system which has taken shape in this country as of the present as capitalism at the state-monopoly stage of its development.

The category of evolved SMC developed by Marxist-Leninist political economy on the basis of a study of the socioeconomic system of the imperialist countries of the West reflects a qualitatively different level of the development of the

* See Ye. Varga, "Essays on Problems of the Political Economy of Capitalism," Moscow, 1964.

production forces and production relations and a qualitatively different stage in the evolution of bourgeois society as a whole than that at which, we believe, present-day Turkey finds itself.

We do not deny the idea of the spasmodic development of capitalist forms in Turkey which the author puts forward. Capitalism in this country, being conceived on the eve and at the outset of the 20th century, cannot in the modern era pass consecutively through all stages of the "classical" Western path of evolution of the formation. Its coming into being as a system of production relations is determined by two mutually exclusive processes--the development of these relations "from below" and their dying away "from above" and "from outside". The question, consequently, is to find the common resultant in the interaction of the lowest and highest capitalist forms.

Proposing our own evaluation of the level of development of capitalism in Turkey, we proceed from the fact that this country is now largely approaching the indicators of middle-development capitalism, whose upper capitalist production modes do indeed contain structures characteristic of SMC. In our view, the proposed definition--middle-development capitalism with apical forms of SMC--is capable of reflecting both the level and main specific features of the dynamics of capitalism in present-day Turkey.

The degree of development of "apical" SMC itself under the actual conditions of this Asian country or the other varies and should be determined by the level of monopolization of production, the nature of the mutual relations of big national and foreign capital with the state, the position in the world capitalist economy and other factors. In respect of Turkey Soviet scientific literature expresses different viewpoints in this connection. One of them is presented in Yu.N. Rozaliyev's work in question. The other and, it would appear, more balanced evaluation of the degree of maturity of state-monopoly institutions in this country is contained in N.G. Kireyev's monograph.* The latter regards SMC in Turkey merely as a trend of socioeconomic development concluding the aspiration of the national haute bourgeoisie, which has strengthened in recent decades, "to subordinate to itself small- and medium-scale production, reorganize the state sector... and enlist the middle strata wholly on its side in the interests of Turkey's accelerated conversion into a country of SMC."** But N.G. Kireyev believes here that it is not yet possible at the start of the 1980's to speak of Turkey as a country of SMC "inasmuch as Turkish big capital and its monopoly upper stratum are not economically strong enough to subordinate to their interests the entire huge economic mechanism called the state sector. This mechanism operates as a whole in the interests of the entire national bourgeoisie and the landowners, although, of course, the haute bourgeoisie and the monopoly upper stratum are acquiring increasingly great opportunities for channeling its activity predominantly toward their interests."***

* See N.G. Kireyev, "The Development of Capitalism in Turkey (A Critique of the 'Mixed Economy' Theory)." Moscow, 1982. For discussion of this work see NARODY AZII I AFRIKI No 2, 1983, pp 184-190.

** N.G. Kireyev, Op. cit., p 273.

*** Ibid., p 255.

As is apparaent from what has been set forth, N.G. Kireyev's interpretation of the nature of the mutual relations of the Turkish bourgeois state and national haute capital differs considerably from the position occupied on this question by Yu.N. Rozaliyev. For our part, we would like to recall that in the general theoretical sphere this problem has been discussed repeatedly in the Soviet scientific press. With reference to the conditions of developed SMC there is a highly convincing ring to the proposition of S.I. Tyul'panov and V.L. Sheynis concerning the fact that for the successful defense of the capitalist system in the modern bourgeois state "its independence must grow in relation to the entire class whose basic interests it expresses and defends and, even more, to individual private monopolies."*

As far as Turkey is concerned, the proposition concerning the establishment of the monopolies' control over the state needs to be adjusted by proceeding from the historically evolved and as yet far from overcome stereotype of the mutual relations of civil society and the state. The power of money in a society which has broken with feudalism comparatively recently and not yet thoroughly "digested" it is not always the equivalent of power as such. In Turkey the authority of the state and the army is considerably higher than in the countries of the bourgeois West, and the degree of relative independence of the state conditioned by general economic factors and also by the specific features of the country's historical development make dubious the possibility of effective control over it on the part of individual monopoly groupings.

I would like in this connection to touch on one further question raised in Yu.N. Rozaliyev's monograph--the prospects of Turkey's political development. It would seem to us that the author is right when he considers possible the establishment of a rigid authoritarian regime in this country. In fact, under the conditions of the extreme seriousness of the socioeconomic and political contradictions being experienced by a society approaching the standards of middle-development capitalism and under the conditions of the deformation of the entire process of social development by the profound dependence on imperialism the model of bourgeois democratism introduced from outside proves, as a rule, ineffective in the eyes of the ruling classes and incapable of ensuring the stable functioning of the system of social exploitation. This leads to the emergence of dictatorships, a variety of which we observe in Turkey at the present time. However, it has to be observed that not any dictatorship in a capitalistically developing society may be defined as fascism. From our viewpoint, the content of the political regime which has been taking shape in Turkey since the military coup of September 1980 is a dictatorship of the upper strata of the entire bourgeois-landowning bloc and not just of the far-right monopoly bourgeoisie exercised by the top brass of the Turkish Army.

We would like to emphasize in conclusion that the journal review framework has forced us to concentrate attention on an analysis of practically just one, albeit central, key idea of a highly trenchant and multifaceted study on the economic history of republican Turkey. The individual propositions of the author's conception which appear to us debatable by no means disaffirm the general high positive evaluation of the scholar's work but testify merely to the insufficient study, complexity and for this reason particular relevance of the

* See S.I. Tyul'panov, V.L. Sheynis, "Topical Problems of the Political Economy of Present-Day Capitalism," Leningrad, 1973, p 80.

direction in the study of modern Turkey instigated by Yu.N. Rozaliyev.

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BOOK ON ROLE OF JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN ECONOMY REVIEWED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 83 pp 188-191

[V.B. Ramzes review of book on Japanese education]

[Text] The book* in question, which has been written on a high scientific level, contains all the elements of creative research: thorough selection and processing of primary material, the organic nature of the perception of the results obtained by other specialists, boldness in the formulation of new problems and originality of methods of their solution. The presence against this background of contentious propositions merely emphasizes the independence of the author's approach and invites discussion, as it were. It has to be mentioned that A.N. Sokolov's work is favorably distinguished from a number of works of Japanese studies which have appeared in recent years, in which, unfortunately, elements of scientific creativity are practically absent and which go no further than superficial descriptions.

A.I. Sokolov concentrates the readers' attention primarily on the socioeconomic efficiency of the education sphere. The first horizon of his quest is revelation of the factors stimulating the conditions for the increased efficiency of this important sector of the production of services. The second is an evaluation of the resources mobilized for the achievement of this goal and their efficacy. The third is a demonstration of the dynamics of efficiency as such and the consequences of these dynamics for the economy and for society as a whole and individual strata thereof.

A favorable impression is made by the author's capacity for considering upon an analysis of the sources of the race for the high efficiency of the education sphere both objective economic factors and subjective psychological features. On the one hand these are consequence of the scientific-technical revolution, which had to be "saddled" for the sake of accomplishing the strategic task of reaching the level of the main capitalist countries and rivalry with them on an equal footing. The scientific-technical revolution was undoubtedly a powerful catalyst initially of the extensive and subsequently of the intensive (connected with the steep upturn of the intellectual-intensiveness of production) development of the education industry. After all, the more rapidly

* A.I. Sokolov, "Yaponiya: ekonomika i obrazovaniye" [Japan: The Economy and Education], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izd-va "Nauka," 1982, p 215.

the mass manufacture of a comparatively short list of standardized products is superseded by the small-series manufacture of a large number of individualized models, the more significant the need for the use of skilled labor becomes.

But, as the book shows, there is also another, perhaps, no less important side--the population's aspiration to education fueled by the possibility of the achievement of various economic and social benefits with the aid thereof. It is a question, *inter alia*, of acquiring prestigious professions and a job in a big company with the best terms of employment and prospects and also of the chances, albeit ephemeral, of a move to the upper strata of the class structure. A.I. Sokolov shows convincingly that this aspiration is capable of being transformed into energetic pressure on state-monopoly capitalism, prompting it to improve the functioning of the education sphere.

The author describes in detail the limiters of the population's aspiration to education: social and property inequality, which makes difficult and sometimes bars altogether access to the desired level of education for many millions of Japanese, and the relative decline, particularly since the end of the 1960's, in the practical utility of education. In addition, as is known, the population's aspiration to education is to a certain extent responsible for the creation in Japan of an atmosphere of "examination anguish" and other negative aspects of the desire for degrees. If even in this atmosphere the factor in question continues to operate actively, this only sheds additional light on the tremendous role of psychology in the economy. This role has to be considered far more seriously than is the case at present, when for certain scholars even a vague hint thereof is anathema.

A.I. Sokolov's analysis of the operative means of increasing the efficiency of the education industry in Japan promises to evoke great interest among the readers. These means are extraordinarily manifold. They all essentially have been employed and continue to be employed as quite bold experiments with by no means guaranteed ultimate success. In any event, Japan's experience in this sphere is valuable for its very attitude toward education not as a set of verified methods elevated to a dogma frozen since time immemorial but as a system which is changing constantly and dynamically, adapting to new and increasingly complex requirements.

Whether the author is studying the satisfaction of the economy's need for skilled personnel or the working people's social need to acquire an education, he puts with complete justification in the forefront the guiding functions of the state. It is precisely the central and local organs of state power which are the initiators and practical purveyors of a series of institutional reforms in the education sphere and measures for reinforcing the physical plant of schools of different levels and profiles, colleges and universities and for the virtually incessant revision of curricula. I would like to mention particularly here the significance of the consultative councils attached to the Ministry of Education, whose recommendations usually have substantial weight and are attentively and not formally studied by the administrative subdivisions and in the majority of cases are implemented in practice.

According to the correct conclusion of A.I. Sokolov, the core of the policy of revision of the curricula is the task of providing for the maximally profound differentiation of tuition. This problem has, perhaps, for a long time now been an uncompromising challenge to world pedagogical science. The steps aimed at its solution in Japan merit, therefore, close attention. It goes without saying that the losses which are willy-nilly incurred by production, science and all of society as a result of the stereotyped procedural approach to students with different capabilities and proclivities do not admit of even a rough computation. But without the least risk of being mistaken they can be estimated as huge.

Of course, the early ascertainment of gifts and the creation of the optimum conditions for their rapid development and use is an exceptionally delicate matter which also contains the threat of serious blunders. This threat is obvious given the domination of capitalist relations, when the allocation of students depending on their intellectual potential contains the poisonous seeds of social discrimination. Nonetheless, exploitation of the concept of "individual differences in capabilities and usefulness, in which both the significance of heredity and the influence of the environment are recognized" (p 166), introduction of general educational and vocational departments in complete high schools, electives and different levels of teaching of one and the same subject, the flexible change of courses with regard for "the progress of scientific-technical knowledge and structural changes in the country's economy" (p 101) and so forth--all this is undoubtedly speeding up the process of saturating each cell of the application of human labor with the diverse personnel contingents from the education viewpoint that they so need.

Taking into account all the pros and cons, I have to observe that the criticism of differentiated tuition which is leveled by representatives of the leftwing opposition in Japan and the Soviet teacher-expert M.L. Rodionov, whom the book quotes, which the author evidently supports seems unduly sharp. Even if it is allowed that differentiation of tuition bars for a large number of students the road to the higher school its macroeconomic and macrosocial beneficence still remains overwhelming. And speaking candidly, the increased competition for places in higher educational institutions to which, the author believes, the differentiation of tuition leads is not of a one-sidedly negative nature. Whatever the case there, competition all the same contributes to the selection of the most gifted and best-trained applicants and a heightened sense of responsibility in those who have made their way through its barriers and ultimately stimulates the personal factor of labor productivity in yesterday's graduates.

We should dwell here on a further position of the author evoking objections. Throughout the book A.I. Sokolov defends the proposition concerning the consciously passive state policy addressed to the higher school, primarily the private higher educational institutions, and the decline for this reason in the quality of the training of graduates. He sees the essence of this passiveness in the small amounts of the state's financial assistance to the private colleges and universities (this aid increased somewhat in the 1970's, but is, as before, at a far from acceptable level). The book only once mentions the reasons for such a situation (in the section dealing with the first

postwar years): "Higher education proved to be beyond the sphere of interests of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) since inhabitants of rural areas not all that interested in higher education served as its main support" (p 30).

I assume that even at the time in question the problem could not have been so rectilinear. The LDP's natural endeavor to expand its social base demanded and continues to demand the utmost intervention in various spheres of social life and a constant strengthening of influence and control over them. How could the ruling party and, consequently, the state authorities under its jurisdiction on their own volition have paid "comparatively little attention to the development of the higher school," particularly the private higher educational institutions? The latter fact is truly puzzling--after all, 80 percent of students are concentrated in private educational institutions, and in view of the high tuition fees, the proportion of those among them from well-to-do families, that is, from the social stratum ideologically close to the conservatives, is considerable (see pp 66, 98).

An attentive familiarization with the material of the book convinces us of the absence of any paradox. The LDP and the bourgeois state have never been of their own volition passive in respect of the private sector of the higher school and as time goes by, the more persistently they attempt to establish firm domination over it, by means of an increase in financial aid included. However, the state is not omnipotent. On the one hand it encounters the limited nature of financial resources. On the other, the private higher educational institutions are, generally, customary commercial enterprises which defend their autonomy with no less and, perhaps, with greater resolve than other subjects of the business world. In Japan, where the state's image was once strongly tarnished precisely by its hegemonist propensities, the struggle of the private higher educational establishments for independence is highly meaningful, and A.I. Sokolov is not, of course, confused as regards what represents the main stake therein. "Thus," he writes, "the state's expansion of aid to the private higher educational institutions and of control over their activity testifies to the increased state-monopoly regulation of the development of the higher school in Japan" (p 120).

Further, if a decline in the quality of higher educational institution graduates is in fact taking place, judging by the results achieved by Japan's economy, it is not that significant. Incidentally, the utterances on this score by employers, that is, persons not interested in striking an advertisement of their wage workers, should be perceived with great caution.

The section in the book on the socioeconomic efficiency of the education system as a whole proved laconic, but very capacious. It is good that A.I. Sokolov shares the viewpoint according to which the efficiency of this cannot be judged only in accordance with some single criterion. For those who are vainly seeking such a criterion, endowing it in advance with the magical properties of the philosopher's stone, he offers useful food for thought: "An entire system of indicators with various aspects and with a varying degree of generalization reflecting the efficiency of the education system is needed" (p 86).

In such a position, the author discloses a number of essential details. Thus he shows that the Japanese system of education and vocational training has for a long time failed to satisfy the quantitative demand for educational institution graduates. At the same time this system has ensured the "overeducation" of manpower compared with the technological level of production and the current level of the economic development of the country. In turn, thanks to the "overeducation," many less prestigious and less skilled occupations have been filled with a highly educated work force. According to the correct observation of Japanese specialists quoted in the book, "Japan's rapid economic growth was possible thanks precisely to the undoubted advance of a highly educated work force into new spheres of activity" (p 89). Nor must it in any event be forgotten that the Japanese system of education enabled the workers to change production functions flexibility in accordance with the changed production conditions. This facilitated considerably the borrowing of foreign technical achievements.

Directly related to the problem of the efficiency of the education industry is, finally, the connection between an increase in the level of education of the work force and its labor motivation. Valuable observations may be encountered in the book which demonstrate the oppressive impact of the first on the second. The reference is to a decline in the degree of job satisfaction, the weakening of the specific attachment to one's "own" firm and so forth. Nor have these changes remained unnoticed by Japanese scientists. For example, forecasters from Japan's Economic Research Center foresee that by the end of the current decade they will have reduced to nothing such a factor of the rapid growth of the country's economy as a conscientious, industrious work force. A nuance of considerable importance is, however, lost sight of here. The labor motivation of the work force in Japan is also based, apart from anything else, on consumer temptations, which have developed rapidly since the war. The rise in the educational level is not only increasing these temptations but also making them refined. This is a colossal counterweight to the trend noted in the book toward the slackening of the desire to work and, I believe, it will prevent this slackening assuming proportions dangerous for the interests of the economy.

We have examined above the main themes reflected in the work in question. The author's adroit professional, in the best sense of this word, and, if you like, polemical development of them constitutes the book's main adornment. But I make so bold as to assert that the so-called secondary themes also have been studied there with the same thoroughness. I would mention just the sections on the characteristic features of the basic components of the Japanese system of training the work force, the structural and qualitative singularities of the contingent of educational institution graduates and so forth. All this together affords us the possibility of considering A.I. Sokolov's monograph a notable contribution to the money-box of our knowledge about Japan.

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KIM EDITS BOOK ON AFRO-ASIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 3, May-Jun 83 pp 198-200

[Yu.N. Gavrilov review of book* on ideological problems of Afro-Asian national liberation movement]

[Text] The cooperation of orientalist of the socialist countries was in the last decade an appreciable factor determining the state and prospects of the development of topical problems of the anti-imperialist struggle in Asian and African countries. In particular, thanks to the joint efforts of specialists of the USSR and the GDR, certain successes were scored in a scientific analysis of the regularities of the development of the revolutionary process in the emergent countries and the role of the working class and ruling vanguard parties of the working people in the implementation of progressive transformations.

The book in question,** which came out simultaneously in Russian and German,*** is a specific manifestation of socialist integration in the sphere of social science. It is the result of the successful joint work of experts from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies and the GDR Academy of Sciences Central History Institute in the sphere of study of the regularities of the development of the social thought and ideology of political movements in Asian and African countries and the influence of ideas on the processes of social renewal and the choice of socioeconomic development paths.

The book is opened by articles introducing the reader to the list of basic ideological problems of the emergent countries and the correlation of the national and international and national and class in the theoretical platforms of political parties and various organizations and groups. Placing at the

* "Aktual'nyye problemy ideologii natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya v stranakh Azii i Afriki" [Topical Problems of the Ideology of the National Liberation Movement of Asian and African Countries], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izd-va "Nauka," 1982, p 447.

** Editorial board: G.F. Kim, A.S. Kaufman, L.R. Polonskaya, M. (Gzheshkovy), M. Rabbe, G. Hepp.

*** "Geistige Profile Asiens und Afrikas. Aktuelle Fragen der ideologischen Auseinandersetzung in der nationalen Befreiungsbewegung," Berlin, "Akademie-Verlag," 1982, p 401.

forefront the problem of the mutual relations of proletarian and bourgeois ideologies and correctly emphasizing the paramount significance of the unity and alliance of world socialism and the international communist and workers movement with the anti-imperialist liberation struggle of the peoples of former colonial countries, the authors note that even under current conditions many aspects of nationalist ideology continue to preserve a "historical justification" and a certain positive charge.

G.F. Kim, L.R. Polonskaya, A.D. Litman and A.S. Kaufman analyze the factors which gave rise to the evolution of nationalism in Asian and African countries and determine its social and functional differences from the corresponding ideological currents which existed in different periods of European history and also the factors of differentiation of this complex and multilevel phenomenon. The book emphasizes, in particular, that correctly and broadly understood national interests afford an opportunity for the expression of the interests of the working majority and for the assertion of revolutionary-democratic ideology and the transition, of at least some of its purveyors, as a result of deepening cooperation with victorious socialism, to positions of proletarian internationalism. While noting the existence of fundamental factors objectively creating the prerequisites for the development of the cooperation of communists and revolutionary democrats, the authors adopt a manifold approach to the different types and manifestations of the ideology of nationalism.

The ideological-political differentiation of nationalism, indirectly reflecting the social processes occurring in the emergent countries, is manifested particularly distinctly, as the book observes, in respect of the problem of paths of development. In particular, L.R. Polonskaya distinguishes two trends in the development of nationalism. In his opinion, a leading trend in the development of social thought in the emergent countries is the "combination of socialism with the workers movement and the formation of the revolutionary-democratic ideology of the working strata," the other is "the gradual loss by individual bourgeois ideological currents of the specific features of the nationalism of oppressed nations, their general turn to the right and the increasingly great correspondence of their forms and class content" (p 45). The assertion of the primacy of social relations and interests, confirming the action of general regularities of social development, does not rule out, as the author correctly observes, the emergence of a specific-historical situation wherein the temporary predominance of the state and national over the social is possible (pp 45-46).

The authors of the book do not confine themselves to a statement of the proposition that even under current conditions national feelings and ideas may exert a direct influence on the ideological-political struggle in the emergent countries. The book helps us understand the reasons for the tenacity of the ideology of nationalism. In particular, it provides a varied illustration of the problem of the stability of the initial forms of political struggle and the ideas and notions which correspond to them and, generally, of the role of tradition in social consciousness. The article "The Influence of 'Traditionalism' on an Interpretation of the Problems of Classes and the Class Struggle in Nonproletarian Theories of Socialism (on the Basis of the Example of Tanzania)," which was written by J. Herzog, is of undoubted interest in this connection.

Endeavoring to ascertain the significance of tradition for the shaping of the ideology of nonproletarian strata, J. Herzog concludes that traditions "are, as it were, the mediators between past and present and old and new and thus serve the preservation and reinterpretation of the historical achievements of preceding societies" (p 280). The role of tradition, J. Herzog writes, "ultimately depends on the nature of the old, historically enshrined social structures and institutions and political and cultural phenomena, the class forces which use them in the present and the purpose they objectively serve" (p 282).

There is importance for an investigation of the problem of traditions in study of the role of religion in the ideological-theoretical and social-political life of the emergent countries inasmuch as religion is primarily and to the greatest extent based on the traditional heritage. The book in question makes, we believe, a serious contribution to the study of the role of Islam and an understanding of the singularities of the ideological-theoretical ideas and political behavior of different social strata of the emergent countries. A vast amount of factual material and generalizations deserving of attention are contained in the section written by M. (Gzheshkovyuk). The approach of M. (Gzheshkovyuk), R.M. Sharipova and A.I. Ionova to the elucidation of the role of the Muslim religion in the contemporary Afro-Asian world is determined by the fact that religious ideas are of the greatest prevalence among the peasant masses and urban strata and for this reason must unfailingly be taken into account in the activity of political parties and public organizations with respect to political mobilization of the masses. The Islamic scholars who appear in the book note that in a number of instances the use of the working people's religious notions for their mobilization for the implementation of progressive transformations is possible even under current conditions (p 224).

The certain revived assertiveness of religious circles is also connected, the monograph emphasises, with the fact that theologians are studying or pretending to study social problems. The influence of religious concepts of "socialism," including "Muslim socialism," A.I. Ionova writes, is determined by the fact that their conceptual apparatus is customary for the masses' perception of the world. At the same time these theories are "a direct reaction to the growing interest in the Muslim masses in socialism, which, in turn, expands the zone of the ideological confrontation" of capitalism and socialism (p 241). As a whole, the evaluation of the book's authors of the role of religion in the present-day ideological struggle is determined by the fact that religion represented a distinctive form of reaction to colonial oppression. Ignoring religion, nationalism could not have taken possession of the consciousness of the masses. Its ideologists took account of the fact that the appeal to religion not only contributes to the popularization in broad strata of the population of the goals, principles and methods of the national liberation struggle but also imparts to this struggle the nature of a religious-moral duty (pp 64-65).

A. Hafner's section is devoted to the fundamentally important problem of the interconnection of the social structure and ideological currents and the stages of the sociopolitical maturation of the working class. The author outlines a number of fruitful approaches to the problem which take account both of the

complexity and difficulties of the process of the conversion of the working class of the emergent countries into a "class for itself" and also the real ways and means of overcoming different varieties of particularism and traditionalism in its consciousness. Significant, we believe, is the fact that in characterizing the existing difficulties A. Hafner does not confine himself to a general proposition concerning the "relative underdevelopment of the socioeconomic and class structure" but infuses it with specific content. We have to agree with his proposition that the shaping of the class consciousness of the working class is being held back by "general socioeconomic backwardness and also by religious, patriarchal and other traditional relations.... The low percentage of 'indigenous' proletarians and the constant influx into their ranks of petty bourgeois elements are contributing to the preservation in the working class of the traditional way of thinking and petty bourgeois notions and holding back the formation of the working class as a class 'for itself'. For this reason not only the bourgeois mass but also a considerable proportion of the working class is the purveyor of petty bourgeois ideology" (pp 272-273).

The connection between socioeconomic and ideological problems is also examined in the article by N. Khasan and S. Mamedogly "The Economic and Ideological-Political Situation in Iran in the 1960's-1970's". Describing the aggregate of reforms implemented by the shah's regime, the authors conclude that they were aimed at perpetuating the monarchy. "The change toward the accelerated development of capitalism was effected under the conditions of the preservation and strengthening of the positions of the shah's court. As far as the number of social measures is concerned, they were brought about by an endeavor to alleviate the increased sociopolitical contradictions and promote the country's development along the capitalist path" (p 429).

In the opinion of N. Khasan and S. Mamedogly, the active participation of a considerable proportion of the Shi'ite clergy in the opposition movement was explained by the fact that the doing away with the old foundations was accompanied by a deterioration in the material and social position of a substantial mass of the population, primarily the peasants and traditional middle urban strata. "Perceiving particularly acutely primarily the outward manifestations of these processes and not seeing the deep-lying bases of the deterioration in living conditions, these strata had an extremely hostile attitude in respect of the regime and its policy of the country's development in accordance with the Western model. Inasmuch as no political systems other than the religious and nationalist-religious were accessible to these strata, the concepts of social justice put forward by religious figures and embellished in religious tones exerted a tremendous influence on them" (p 436). The article also describes the secular opposition to the shah's regime and the contribution of the Iran People's Party to the political and organizational preparation of the revolution. M.S. Kapitsa's article is devoted to the problem of leftism and a description of its sociopolitical purveyors and the singularities of its manifestation in the zone of the anti-imperialist liberation struggle.

The articles of I. Icherensk, M. Rabbe, G. Hepp, B.A. Shabad and A.G. Bel'skiy are of undoubted interest. I would like to mention particularly the trenchant surveys of Soviet historiography and GDR historiography with respect to problems of ideology and ideological processes in Asian and African countries

prepared by A.Kh. Vafa and K. Schuenke respectively. The attention of Soviet orientologists is attracted by the survey of Krista Schuenke, which sets forth in concise form the methodological principles determining the approach of the GDR's social scientists to study of the ideology of the anti-imperialist liberation struggle and evaluates the views and concepts of different authors. The material adduced in the survey testifies to the high level of research in the GDR into problems of the development of ideology and the ideological struggle in Asian and African countries.

While evaluating highly the book as a whole, regret has to be expressed in connection with the fact that it fails to take into account or make any mention even of the foregoing experience of cooperation of orientologists of the USSR and the GDR in the development of topical problems of the revolutionary movement in Asian and African countries.

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